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 Organizations are policy-driven entities.  Policy bases can be very large 
and complex; these factors are in the dynamic nature of policy evolution.  The 
mechanical aspects of policy modification and assurance of the consistency, 
completeness, and correctness of a policy base can be automated to some degree. 
Such support is known as computer support for policy.  
      We developed an object-oriented schema-based approach to structure 
policy. Our structural model consists of Unified Modeling Language class and 
collaboration diagrams. The structural model is used by a suite of testing tools. 
We present a case study to illustrate our approach to automated testing of policy.   
      Our approach to test-case generation is based on the use of pattersn within 
policy statements and relationships between policy objects. The test spectrum has 
query-specific tests at one end, and the generic types of tests at the other end. We 
introduce the use of statistical inference to reuse test cases by determining the 
patterns  that approximate the query-to-be-executed. Query mapping, anytime 
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Organizations are policy-driven entities [36]. An organization’s policy 
defines when and in what context the policy is applicable, what information must 
be available for the policy to be used and enforced, what to do if a policy is 
violated or is inconsistent with another policy, and how to evaluate adherence to 
policy [8].  
Policies are statements of goals, or rules or guidance governing the actions 
taken to satisfty goals[36]. They provide broad direction and goals. The “policy” 
term is synonymous with preferred behavior. 
Policies may be implicit (i.e., unwritten) or explicit, and govern the 
behavior of the actors for whom the policy applies. There is a natural hierarchy of 
policy. At the highest level is meta policy: policy about policy. For example, a 
meta policy might specify when lower level policies should be enforced.  Policy 
can be decomposed into successive finer levels of abstraction, until at some point 
the refinement yields one or more system requirements. 
Policy bases can be very large and the relationships between policies can 
be complex [36]. An ad hoc approach to structuring policy might add more 
complexity to the existing policy base. Moreover, checking for gaps in policy or 
analyzing the consequences of changing policy in an unstructured policy base 
turns policy testing into a computationally hard problem. The main reason behind 
this problem is the difficulty of creating a policy test suite that can check for 
inconsistencies, incompleteness, and other gaps.  
Merging, reorganization, restructuring and downsizing efforts in an 
organization or among organizations can change one or more of its policies. 
Policies must be structured in such a way that enables seamless integration after 
merging, reorganization or downsizing.  
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A policy workbench—an integrated set of computer-based tools for 
developing, reasoning about, and maintaining policy—is intended to assist the 
makers and users of policy.  
 
B. MOTIVATION 
The motivation for our research stems from the need to automate the 
testing of policy. The tasks involved in using the diverse array of tools within a 
policy workbench for testing could be viewed by a user as difficult or even 
insurmountable. Testing policy in its computation form requires a certain level of 
technical expertise (e.g., a knowledge of formal methods) and involves 
information-processing tasks that are best suited to be mechanized rather than 
performed manually. It is impossible to prove the absence of gaps in policy, so 
one must satisfice by  demonstrating that the policy is free of gaps for specific test 
cases. The challenge is to determine which test cases to run and what the 
composition of those test cases should be.  In this thesis, we introduce a 
systematic and repeatable process for automatically testing policy. 
 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
Our hypothesis is that it is possible to automatically generate test cases for 
operational policy by utilizing test patterns.  
 
D. SCOPE 
The primary focus of this thesis is on automatically testing for logical 
consistency among operational policies. We limit our investigation of test-case 
generation to support for using a first-order resolution-style theorem prover. In 
addition, we only consider the use of object-oriented structural models of policy 
statemens from which to search for test patterns.  
2 
E. SUMMARY OF APPROACH 
The approach employed in this thesis consists of the following: 
• Conduct a thorough literature survey and analyze different 
approaches on structuring and developing policy, and testing the 
policy workbench.  
• Create an object-oriented schema of the policy base, using the 
Unified Modeling language to document the model. 
• Develop test cases, and scenarios to perform regression testing to 
ascertain the consequences of modifying policy. 
• Maintain relationships and linkages among policies using test 
patterns. 
• Query the existing policy base using a pattern-driven method of 
testing. 
Organizations are policy-driven entities. Before the policy is refined into 
requirements for the system, the policy base needs to be checked for gaps, such as 
inconsistency or incompleteness. A policy workbench can be used to represent, 
reason about, maintain, implement, and enforce policy[36]. A policy workbench 
is an integrated suite of tools. [53]is one of the examples that uses automation to 
maintain, reason about, refine or enforce policy. Sibley, Michael, and Wexelblat 
propose an five-class architecture for a generic policy-workbench [52]. The policy 
base used in this thesis consists of operational policies. Operational policy can be 
represented as if-then (i.e., conditional) rules. For instance, if the actor is an agent, 
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and the head of the sending office, then she is obliged to sign the consignment 
note attached to the secret document.  
In this thesis, we present a systematic way of structuring and developing 
policy using the Unified Modeling Language (UML); UML is a notation for 
expressing object-oriented designs. The policy maker enters policy, the policy 
workbench maintains a current data dictionary, tests the consistency of policy 
statement in relation to extant policy, and proposes scenarios for feedback. 
Michael, Ong and Rowe developed a natural-language input-processing tool 
(NLIPT) that translates policy into an object-oriented schema and formal models 
[53],  relieving  the user of the policy workbench from the error-prone task of 
manually generating the formal models. 
Secondly, regression testing is performed against criteria such as 
correctness and  consistency(i.e.,second user class). Test cases are developed 
based on the following test patterns: temporal, sequence, and counting aspects of 
the policy. The goal of the testing in this phase is to ascertain the consequences of 
modifying the policy base. These changes include adding a new policy, deleting 
an existing policy, composing policy, and modifying an existing policy. 
Lastly, the policy base is analyzed via queries. A repository of queries is 
established. Each user query is associated with a test or a suite of tests. The policy 
user can reach this repository of queries through an interface. Maintaining queries 
in a repository also helps the policy user structure future queries based on 
previous ones and reuse the queries and query results. For instance for update 
operation, the update operation is converted into a query(or set of queries), then 
4 
evaluated using the testing techniques described in this thesis. Moreover, an 
approximation to dead-end queries can be obtained from the repository which 





























 II. UML IN THE DESCRIPTION AND STRUCTURE OF 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF POLICY 
A. UML SUPPORT FOR MODELING POLICY 
Modeling is a crucial part of all of the activities that lead up to the 
development of good software. Most object-oriented methods provide a family of 
graphical notations for creating abstract models of a system’s behavior. The 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) [17] has become a widely used notation for 
expressing object-oriented designs. UML is a language for specifying, 
constructing, visualizing, and documenting artifacts of software-intensive systems 
[31]. The common interest is to use UML to create common interchangeable 
models for facilitating distributed design. UML uses a viewpoint-based 
description [8] with a family of diagrams, each of which is tailored for 
representing some aspect of the system under test(SUT).  
Most of the work reported on UML defines and explains UML in terms of 
the construction of complete specifications. Despite the richness of constructs for 
modeling constraints, the language does not provide direct support for 
representing policy. In other words, the language’s support for representing 
behavior does not provide for the creation of parameterized specifications or 
creation of related specifications by substituting specific policies into a 
framework. Linington [8] asserts that the expressive power can be provided by 
using UML as a base.  
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UML provides different types of diagrams types supporting the 
development process, from requirements specification to implementation. The 
UML diagrams support the creation of different views of the same system and 
modeling the system at multiple levels of abstraction. By using the four-tier 
architecture of the language [12] (i.e., user objects, model, metamodel, and 
metametamodel) policy objects at different abstraction levels can be specified. 
Moreover, the language enables the transformation of UML diagrams into other 
UML diagrams. The beauty of this transformation is the ease of transformation at 
different levels of the policy-object hierarchy.  
Policy tends to be dynamic in nature. As the organizatio’s policy changes, 
the updates to the policy need to modeled in order for the user of the policy 
workbench to reason about the changes. The representation of policy using UML 
notation results in common models of policy, which can then be refined into 
lower level system artifacts, thus providing a common representation for tracing 
between levels of refinement and the effects of changes throughout the policy 
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Figure 1. The Need for UML Diagram Tranformations. 
 
The policy objects represented at different abstraction levels using UML 
can be incorporated into different policy objects at different abstraction levels via 





       1. The Advantages of Using The Formal Specifications in UML 
           The lack of formal semantics for object-oriented modeling notations can 
limit their use in the development of large, complex, or critical systems. Formal 
software specifications in UML have the following advantages [11]: 
• Formal specification describes the behavior and structure being 
modeled free from most of the implementation details 
• Formalizing an object-oriented model can reveal gaps, ambiguities, 
and inconsistencies 
• Identification and retrieval of components can be partially automated 
• Formal specifications and their associated formal system provide a 
basis for automated forward engineering (i.e., the creation of code 
from a model) and reverse engineering (the process of transforming 
code into a model through a mapping from a specific implementation 
language) 
      In addition to the advantages stated above, formal specifications built into 
the UML diagrams ease the process of verification and validation of models. In 
other words, the definition of the formal semantics of UML adds precision to the 
model and supports the use of advanced tools. 
    2. The Expectations from UML Formalism   
      The choice of the formalism depends on what the user expects from the 
formal semantics. The support expected from UML can be stated as follows [18], 
as shown in Figure 2: 
a. Executability 
            This goal emphasizes the need for an operational formal semantics 
profile for UML. To give complete semantics to UML means to say exactly for 
every particular UML model, how the UML model  is expected to behave at run-
time and what are the semantics of the elements of the UML model. One way to 
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provide a complete operational semantics is to adopt the use of Abstract State 
Machines (ASM), which are composed of both static and dynamic semantics [18]. 
All of the models share a common part that contains the description of the basic 
principles (i.e., class, operation, attribute). Thus, a part of the static semantics can 
be realized by expressing in ASM the UML meta-model and well-formedness 
rules defined in the UML standard. The dynamic semantics are based on a set of 
behavior primitives such as time and communication. Finally, by using static and 
dynamic semantics, a symbolic execution of an UML model can be performed.  
b. Understandability 
       Understandability is required to use UML correctly. Formalism 
with artifacts in UML is combined to precisely express policy and other system 
artifacts. Formalization for the sake of formalism does not necessarily enhance a 
model’s understandability. The beauty of object-oriented design methodologies is 
their visual, intuitively appealing, modeling notations [17]. Thus, formalization 
efforts should increase but not degrade these powerful characteristics. For 
instance, Shroff and France have built formalism into UML, but the complexity of 
their resulting models makes these models difficult to understand. On the other 
hand, loose interpretation of the diagrams can convey different meanings to 
different users. Errors in interpretation (i.e., confusion and disagreement over the 
precise meaning of a model) can occur when hard-to-understand graphical 
notation. 
 c. Extensibility 
        It should be possible to add new concepts with a minimum effort. 
Policies are dynamic objects [15]. In our work, precisely specified policy objects 
with full semantics not only increase the understanding of the current policy 
objects but also eases the task of updating the model of policy. 
d. Modifiability 
       The changes to policy should have a minimal impact on the rest of 
the semantics. The formalism must provide for ease of modifying and testing 
policy. As the policy objects are already defined in formal specifications, the 
10 
policy operations can be tested without actually implementing them. The results 
of testing enable to determine the inconsistencies(i.e., logical contradictions), 
violations and harmony(i.e., the seamless integration of multiple policy bases 
without any consistency). These and other gaps need to be resolved prior to 


































   3. Why do We Need Formalism in UML? 
An important part of UML is its semantics. Meta-models are used to 
describe the syntax of UML’s static and behavioral models, while semantic details 
are expressed in informal English [10]. Unfortunately, the informal nature of 
these semantics is inadequate for justifying the use of formal analysis techniques 
with UML models.   
 
B. POLICY REPRESENTATION 
   1. What is Included in the Policy? 
      A policy statement can define when the policy is applicable, what 
information must be available for the policy to be used and enforced, defining the 
decision process of what to do if a policy is violated or is inconsistent with 
another policy, how to evaluate adherence to the policy, and defining all 
invariants that must be adhered to for the policy to be effective [8]. In short, 
policy statements express constraints on the actions that constitute behavior 
within or between systems.  
                        According to Linington, policy articulation involves the following: 
• Defining a set of circumstances in which the policy is to apply 
• Identifying some non-trivial choice to be made under the control of the 
policy 
• Identifying what information that must be available for the policy to be 
interpreted 
• Defining a decision procedure to be applied in assessing the situation 
and in actually making the choice 
12 
• Defining any invariants that may needs to be respected by the system 
in general for the policy to be effective 
 Very few policies apply universally, without any preconditions. For 
instance, an access control policy must be clear as to what kind of access is being 
controlled, and whether the policy applies at all times, or only within some range 
of hours.  
            The need for invariants emerges from the idea to preserve the object 
during actions. For example, consider the policy “Classified documents can only 
be accessed by agents with adequate clearances.” This would be ineffective if 
anyone could define a local procedure for changing the classification of 
documents; so an invariant is needed which states that the parties other than the 
sender cannot change the classification level of the document. As an alternative to 
invariants, one could also apply the constraint on classification as a prohibition. 
The policy “Any agent who is not the sender of a classified document is 
prohibited to change the classification of this document” resolves this problem by 
directly forbidding the unwanted behavior by stating it as a separate rule instead 
of using invariants. 
      “What to include into the policy and what not to” [2] is the key component 
that eases or hardens the automation of representing policy. Cuppens in [2] stated 
that the complexity and ambiguity of the policy at hand is the most cumbersome 
and time-consuming problem to resolve during the specification of policy. To 
formalize the policy, their first task was to clarify the subtleties contained in the 
policy document written in an “administrative natural language.” The efforts to 
formalize a badly written policy is to get a correct and as precise as possible 
interpretation of the policy at hand. Moreover, the formalization of policy 
required the experts to know the administrative language used in the policy. The 
experts knowing the organizational administrative language can extract the 
definitions and normative rules from the policies without missing any rules.  
13 
            As a solution to ambiguous policies, [11] and [1] proposed automated 
forward engineering or a schema-based approach (i.e., the formalization of policy 
from a structural model of policy). Michael et al. found out that during the 
axiomatization process, a schema-based approach produced fewer errors in 
formalizing security policy than the non-schema-based approach. Using a model 
starting from the creation of policy in natural language will make clear what to 
include in the policy, decrease the formalization effort needed, and prevent 
structuring errors. 
      Who makes the policy and the styles for making the policy are out of the 
scope of this thesis; see [8] for more information about the actors and the styles. 
   2. Policy Representation in UML 
            As Linington states in [8], there are many possible ways policies can be 
formulated. In this thesis, we explore the main features of identifying a number of 
kinds of policy on different views. 
     The first step is to sort the things out that need to be specified in the 
policies. For clarity, conciseness and preciseness of the information in the 
specification, the following is a list given in [8]: 
• Configure the constraints by controlling the cardinality of associations, 
or by constraining values reached by the navigation. Some 
configuration constraints cannot be expressed by cardinalities alone.  
• Pieces of behavior can be specified by a use-case, or by a behavior, 
which is non-deterministic or has many possible transitions. 
• Pre/post conditions can be added to actions, making the outcome of 
part of behavior more specific. In other words, this means prohibiting 
non-compliant actions. 
• Internal structure can be added to states, providing detailed procedure 
for continuing actions within a high-level state.  
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• Optimization policies can be established for some or all of the 
behavior.  Refinement of the optimization conditions needs to express 
the community objective effectively. 
      As a side note to the list, the invariants are advantageous to use as long as 
the invariants relate reasonably closely to the granularity of the model. The 
approaches in the preceding list are based on the creation of the policies via the 
design-tool chain. Linington’s remarks does not fit well with specific set of 
policies (that is,the interpretation of polices for which most of the parts are 
generated by interactions at “run-time”). 
 a. The Difficulties of Representing Policies in UML 
                  As discussed in [8] many aspects of a policy statement can be 
represented within UML by adding constraints or additional finer scale structure 
to an existing pure-UML-diagrams-only design. However, the following two 
issues should be addressed: 
• How to declare the extra body of information as a 
policy 
• How to express limits on the policies which will 
actually be acceptable in a given situation 
            Resolution of these issues is needed to capture the aspects of the 
development process that are beyond the scope of UML.  
   3. Ways of Representing Policy Using UML as a Framework 
      By taking UML as a framework, the difficulties of policy representation 
mentioned above can be overcomed. Linington in [8] is the forerunner in the 
literature who clearly defines strategies for representing policy using UML. 
According to his classification, policy can be represented in three ways: 
a. Defining Policies as Classes 
                  The policy maker defines a class that clarifies the detailed behavior 
to express the policy. Just naming the class is too weak. As the policy objects are 
15 
in a hierarchical manner, the new class must be put in its place in this hierarchy. 
To meet that goal, the author of the main specification would provide upper and 
lower classes; see Figure 3. In addition to that, the author applies whatever 
constraints would be necessary and asssigns a policy class to the policy objects in 
the package to form an inheritance chain. The upper classes define the policy 
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       UPPER 
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Figure 3. Policy Class in Policy Framework. 
 
           We represent policy objects as classes in this thesis. One of the 
reasons behind this decision is our goal to use UML as a tool to define and 
structure policy. Once the class diagrams of the policy objects are at hand, the 
detailed diagrams are derived from these class diagrams. This method permit us to 
16 
merge multiple diagrams.  See an example of “defining policies as classes” in the 
Chapter III. 
b. Defining Policies as Communities 
A community is a set of interacting objects that have come 
together into a configuration so that they can interact to achieve some purpose. 
Communities are typed and their type determines the broad kinds of behavior they 
can exhibit, and the policies, which control their formulation, interaction and 
evolution [19]. Community is widely used in Open Distributed Processing (ODP). 
Communities can also be represented as collaboration diagrams; this way of 
representation is out of the scope of this thesis. For further information on this 
topic see [19]. 
c. Defining Polices as Diagrams 
Defining policies as diagrams isolates each policy from the 
remainder of the specification by using the presentation structure. The challenge 
is to merge multiple diagrams into a single model to unify the material into a 
single specification. It is not clear that tool support for interpreting multiple 
diagrams is present.  The advantage of this representation strategy is that it places 
very little restriction on the policy specification process. See Appendix E for 
examples of defining policy as diagrams of the case study in Chapter III. 
   4. Deontic Logic as a Policy Structuring Method 
As the concepts of permission, prohibition and obligation are formally 
studied in deontic logic, it is suitable as a starting point for the specification of a 
normative system. A normative system is a system in which the behavior of the 
interaction among policy objects is governed by a set of norms [19].  The 
concepts of prohibitions, obligations and permissions can be referred to as deontic 
statements about a system. [19] used deontic logic for the Reference Model for 
Open Distributed Processing(RM-ODP) enterprise modeling and also [2] used it 
for specifying security policy. We also adopt deontic logic in this thesis for the 
following reasons: 
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• It represents a universal formal language, useful for expressing 
any kind of knowledge or data. 
• It supports formal calculus methods. 
• There is tool support (e.g., PROLOG, OTTER, and other 
automated reasoning programs). 
Deontic logic has some limitations, not accounting for the interactions 
between agents. But such limitations do not affect the course of the case studies in 
this work. 
Three deontic modalities are permission, obligation and prohibition. The 
RM-ODP defines the permission as “a prescription that a particular behavior is 
allowed to occur. A permission is equivalent to there being no obligation for the 
behavior not to occur.” Permission also can be defined by  the following [20]: 
• An action 
• A participant-role in that action 
• A predicate on social behavior 
• A community-role 
• An authority which grants the permission 
The concept of permission can either be regarded as “having permission” 
or “granting permission.” The former relates to what actions may occur, while the 
latter involves an implicit or explicit agency, and there are consequential 
obligations on the authority as a result of granting permission. Thus, the authority 
should not normally simultaneously grant permission and prevent the permitted 
action from taking place. For instance, “If AgentA is permitted to perform 
ActionB, then AgentA has the right to choose whether to perform the action, but 
the authority has no such choice; it is obligated to allow AgentA  to perform 
ActionB.” The analysis of obligations implied by granting permissions is an area 
in which some level of conflict and inconsistencies in the obligation is inevitable. 
18 
These areas are fruitful for testing in the context of checking for logical 
inconsistencies between policies. 
RM-ODP defines prohibition as “a prescription that particular behavior 
must not occur. A prohibition is equivalent to there being an obligation for the 
behavior not to occur”[20]. Prohibition is also defined similarly as follows: 
• An action 
• A participant-role in that action 
• A predicate on social behavior 
• A community-role 
• An authority which grants the permission 
If one of the agents has this prohibition, then the agent cannot play the 
participant-role in the action. 
RM-ODP defines obligation as “a prescription that particular behavior is 
required. An obligation is fulfilled by the occurrence of the prescribed behavior 
[20].” Obligations are different from permissions and prohibitions. First of all, 
obligations are not granted or imposed, but rather are agreed as a part of joining a 
contract. Obligations are expressed as follows: 
• Enable the trigger conditions such as a predicate that holds 
while the obligation is “active,” that is, if the rule is valid, then 
activate obligation or a pair of activating or deactivating 
conditions that toggle obligations into active and inactive 
modes (i.e., switch rule then case A or case B or case C or 
default).  
• Satisfaction condition and violation condition also enables one 
to set obligations. For instance, standing obligations can never 
be satisfied: they must be defined by a violation condition. 
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The primary purpose of formal methods is to help engineers construct 
more  reliable systems[26]. Graphical object-oriented (OO) models can be used to 
represent real-world concepts. UML has been forwarded as the common language 
for OO modeling. The beauty of using a common language is seamless transfer of 
models between design and analysis tools. 
In summar, UML can be used  for structuring the policy, policy  objects 
and relationships between these objects.  
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III. CASE STUDY 
A. CASE STUDY DESIGN 
 Our design of the case study was challenging for the following reasons: 
Real-world policy tends to be complex and ambiguous(i.e., left open to 
interpretation) when found in natural-language texts. Secondly, the administrative 
language used in a document has subtleties that to be taken into consideration 
when interpreting policy. In order to formalize the policy, the clarification of 
subtleties, ambiguities and imprecision is required. This may require consultation 
with a person who has significant amount of  knowledge about the organization 
and policy formalization. The role of such a person is crucial. Thirdly, the natural 
language policy not only contains normative rules and definitions but also 
contains comments or advice, the latter ones of which are discarded in our case 
study for the sake of simplicity. To include policy that just consists of comments 
or advice is not straightforward to do. Deciding which one is a rule or which one 
is not is troublesome because a policy can take the form of advice. While trying to 
select the rules, the full semantics of the policy might get corrupted. Having only 
formalization knowledge is not enough to convert a natural language statement of 
policy into a formalized policy. [2] stated that creating a formal policy from a 
natural language policy is a time-consuming, cumbersome activity. Lastly, the 
intentional lack of precision in the specification of some policy in large 
organizations for the sake of application flexibility is also an impediment to  
formalization of policy. 
In our case study, some policies can be viewed as conditional rules with 
normative conclusions. In other words, they can be translated by: if this condition 
is satisfied, then this agent is obliged, permitted, or prohibited to do something. 
As the automatic translation of natural-language statements of policy to a 
computational form is outside of the scope of this thesis, the case study developed 
is adapted from [2]. The authors in [2] used their own specification language. We 
chose to use first-order predicate logic with equality as the policy specification 
language. We also choose to use OTTER, a first-order resolution-style theorem 
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prover, as the testing tool. For further details on OTTER see Appendix A. The 
following security policies are well-formed formulae in first-order predicate 
calculus with equality, and notated in the syntax utilized by OTTER. 
   1. Rule 1 
The sender of a classified document is obliged to update the document 
classification as soon as it is possible, i.e. immediately after the sender evaluates 
that the document classification is obsolete. 
(all d 
       (Classified_Document(d) & 
Transmitter(d) & Transmitter(d) = Agent(a) & 
Res_Exec(Transmitter(d),  Evaluate_Classification(d), level) & 
Classification(d) != level   




   2. Rule 2 
Any agent who is not the sender of a classified document is prohibited to 
change the classification of this document. 
(all d 
        (Classified_Document(d) & Transmitter(d) != Agent(a)  





   3. Rule 3 
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The holder of a classified document is permitted to ask the sender to revise 
the classification of this document. 
(all d 




        ) 
). 
   4. Rule 4 
Every organization, which holds some secret documents, is obliged to 
designate an agent who is responsible for preserving these documents. 
(all o ( exists d ( 
Organization(o) & Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret)    
& Works_For(Holder(d),Employees(o))  
 -> 
Obliged_To_Designate_Agent(  
Head(o),  Designate_Responsible(Document_Preservation(o))) 
       )) 
). 
   5. Rule 5 
The sender of the classified document is obliged to establish a entrust note 
of this document. The head of the sending side is obliged to sign this entrust note. 
The head of the sender side is permitted to delegate the obligation to sign the note 
to one of his representatives. 
(all o ( exists d ( 
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        )) 
). 
(all o ( exists d ( 
Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o)  & Classified_Document(d) 
&  
 Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)  
         -> 
Obliged_To_Sign_Note(Head(Sending_Office(o)), 
Sign(Consignment_Note(d))) 
        )) 
). 
(all o ( exists d ( 
Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o) & Classified_Document(d) 
&  
Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)   
& Representative(d) & 
 Works_For(Representative(d),Head(Sending_Office(o))) 
 ->    
Permitted_To_Delegate_Sign(Head(Sending_Office(o)), 
Delegate(Representative(d),Sign(Consignment_Note(d)))) 
        )) 
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). 
   6. Rule 6 
Anybody body who wants to visit a restricted area is obliged to get an 
authorized from the head of that area.  In addition to that, the visitor is obliged to 
be supervised by an agent who is specially designated for supervising visitors. 
( Organization(o) & Protected_Area(a) & Head(a) = h & Person(p) &  
( -(Work_For(p,o)) & -Exec(h, Authorize(p, Visit(a)))) 
 
 ->  
Forbidden_To_Exec( p, Visit(a)). 
( Organization(o) & Protected_Area(a) & Head(a) = h & Person(p) &  
( -(Work_For(p,a))) & -Exec(h, Authorize(p, Visit(a))))  
 
->  
Forbidden_To_Exec( p, Visit(a)). 
(Organization(o) & Protected_Area(a) & Head(a) = h & Person(p) &  
-(Work_For(p,o)) & Exec(h, Authorize(p, Visit(a))) &  
Exec(h, Designate_Responsible( Supervision(p))))  
 
->  
Permitted_To_Exec( p, Visit(a)). 
   7. Rule 7 
The holder of the secret document and the witness of the destruction are 
obliged to sign destruction time at every secret level classified document 
destruction. 
(all d 
(Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) & Holder(d) 
&  
DESTROY_DOCUMENT(d) & Actor(d) & Destroyed_Object(d) 
&  
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        ) 
). 
   8. Rule 8 
After each meeting, the organizer of the meeting is obliged to burn all the 
prepatory documents of this meeting completely. 
(all d 
 (MEETING(d) & (Organizer(MEETING(d))) & 
After(MEETING(d)) &  
 Element_Of_Meeting(d, Prepatory_Documents(MEETING(d)))  
 -> 
 Obliged_To_Burn(Organizer(MEETING(d)), Incinerate(d)) 
        ) 
). 
   9. Rule 9 
The organizer of the meeting is obliged to keep these preparotory 
documents in a safe, unless the documents are burnt completely. 
(all d 
(MEETING(d) & (Organizer(MEETING(d))) & 







   ) 
). 
   10. Rule 10 
The organizer of any meeting is obliged to establish a list of all 
participants before that meeting. 
(all d 





         ) 
). 
   11. Rule 11 
An agent is obliged to work a classified document at the secret level in a 
protected area. 
(all d  
 (Agent(d) & Classified_Document(d) &  
(Classification(d) = Secret) &  
 During_Exec(Agent(d), Elaborate(d))  
 -> 
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 ( During_Exec(Agent(d), Work(Protected_Area(d)))) 
        ) 
). 
   12. Rule 12 
After the destruction of a classified document at the secret level, the 
document holder is obliged to inform the author of the document. 
(all d 
 (Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) &  
 Holder(d) & Exec(Holder(d) , Destroy(d)) & (Transmitter(d))  
 ->  
 Obliged_To_Notify(Holder(d), Notify(Transmitter(d), Destroy(d))) 
        ) 
). 
 
B. REPRESENTING POLICY VIA UML DIAGRAMS 
UML provides a collection of diagrams to capture different aspects of a 
system. For instance, use cases capture user requirements, class diagrams are used 
to capture the static nature of objects. Collaboration and sequence diagrams are 
used to capture dynamic interactions between objects and systems, and package 
and deployment diagrams organize design elements. Based on [8], we choose to 
represent policy via diagrams. Once the policy is represented in diagrams, test 
cases  can be developed as discussed in the next section. The overall schema of 




Figure 4. UML Diagram of the Overall Implementation Schema. 
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C. USING COLLABORATION DIAGRAMS FOR UML 
REPRESENTATION 
Test criteria (i.e., a rule or collection of rules that impose test requirements 
on a set of test cases) can be set based on UML collaboration diagrams. Tests can 
be generated automatically from software design (i.e., policy design), rather than 
code or specifications. Criteria are defined for both static and dynamic testing of 
specification-level and instance-level collaboration diagrams.  
Collaboration is a description of a collection of objects that interact to 
implement some behavior within a specific context. It contains slots (i.e., roles) 
that are filled by objects and links at run time [31]. A collaboration diagram is a 
graphical representation of collaboration. In an object-oriented computing 
paradigm, objects interact with each other to implement behavior. One way of 
representing this interaction is in terms of how they collaborate. In other words, 
collaboration diagrams show the interaction organized around objects that 
participate in the interaction and their links to each other. The objects in a 
collaboration diagram are instances of classes in a class diagram. A collaboration 
diagram has two forms [32]: 
   1. Specification-level Collaboration Diagrams 
Specification-level collaboration diagrams show the roles defined within 
collaborations. The diagram contains a collection of class boxes and lines 
corresponding to ClassifierRole(i.e., a role to be played by an object within a 
collaboration) and AssociationRoles(i.e., a role that defines the relationship of a 
ClassifierRole to other roles) in the collaboration. 
   2. Instance-level Collaboration Diagrams 
An instance-collaboration diagram shows the collaboration of the 
instances of ClassifierRoles and AssociationRoles. 
Specification-level and instance-level collaboration diagrams describe the 
structural relationships among the participants of collaboration and their 
communication patterns. Collaboration diagrams describe the structure and 
30 
behavior of the system. These two forms of collaboration diagrams specify what 
requirements must be fulfilled by the objects in a system, and what 
communications must take place between the objects for a specific task to be 
performed. UML diagrams used at different levels of abstraction provide the 
following information [32]: 
• The objects that are involved in an interaction and the structure 
of these objects. 
• Instances of allowable sequences of operation calls to an object 
• The semantics of an operation 
• The operations that are imported from other classes, thus 
enabling a collaboration with objects of the other class 
• The communication pattern of objects in a collaboration 
(synchronous or asynchronous) 
• The execution characteristics of objects (parallel or sequential) 
Using this information, it is possible to generate tests from collaboration 
diagrams. In this thesis, collaboration diagrams are used to structure policy and 
therefore facilitate testing policy.  
Testing can be either static or dynamic [32]. Static testing involves 
checking some aspects of the policy specification without execution. For the static 
testing aspect, collaboration diagrams provide four items to statistically check the 
SUT: 
• Classifier Roles 
• Collaborating Pairs 
• Message or Stimulus 
• Local Variable Definition-Usage Link Pairs 
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Dynamic testing involves testing based on inputs. For the purposes of 
dynamic testing, collaboration diagrams provide the realization of operations. 
Each collaboration diagram represents a complete set of messages during the 
execution of a rule. Therefore, a complete set of message sequence path can be 
traced. The realization of the operations during the execution of that rule can be 
tracked. 
 
D. WHAT ARE THE TEST CASES GIVEN THESE RULES? 
 Based on the given policy rules, test cases are required to be developed for 
policy testing. Depending on the rule, the setup of the test case differs. Each rule 
needs test cases to be tailored accordingly. Defining the actions and actors plays a 
crucial role for tailoring the test cases to the policy. However there is not 
necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between the actions in policy testing and 
those of the actual software implementation of the actions. The software 
implementations of the actions reside at a finer level of abstraction. In contrast, 
the actions in policy testing are modeled at a course level of granularity. To 
develop a fruitful set of test cases the considerations that guide test-case 
generation iscussed for each of the rules in the case study. 
   1.  Rule 1 
In this rule, the user (i.e., sender) is required to: 
• Evaluate the classification of the classified document. 
• Update the classification of the document if the classification 
for that document is obsolete. 
The sender of the classified document is obliged to update the 
classification level of the document as soon as the sender evaluates that the 
classification of the document is obsolete.  “As soon as” needs to be clarified in 
the policy to ensure timely updates by the policy users. There is some degree of 
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ambiguity about the order of the actions. Before proceeding to testing, the policy 
workbench must either: 
• Ask the user for clarification, or 
• Try to make an intelligence guess at the correct interpretation.  
Asking the policy user user for clarification encourages the generation of 
feedback that can be used to tailor the policy according to a particular scenario. 
However, such an approach requires the user to know about the temporal 
property(i.e., the time when a classified document becomes obselete). The 
interpretation of the temporal property should not be left to system, because the 
user might interpret it as a choice left to the user which will become an obstacle in 
policy enforcement. Attempting to make an intelligence guess will facilitate the 
policy testing and does not depend on user input. However, a database of previous 
temporal properties associated with this rule needs to be stored. Thus, the policy 
workbench tool can invoke the temporal property database and based on the result 
set, makes an intelligent guess. A sequence of events takes place before the policy 
user’s evaluation of the classification level. At first, it must be assured that the 
user gets a document. Otherwise, it is out of the scope of this policy. 
   2. Rule 2 
Any agent in the organization is required to do the following: 
• Check the sender of the classified document 
• If that particular agent is not the sender, then the agent is 
prohibited to change the classification. At this point, the test is 
checking against a Boolean value Test (Role = Sender) -> 
{True, False}. 
This rule does not enforce either a temporal property or a sequence 
property.  
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   3. Rule 3 
One of the actors in this rule, the sender is required to send the document. 
The holder (i.e., the receiver of the document) is required to: 
• Evaluate the classification of the document 
• Notify the sender to revise the classification of the document if 
needed 
This rule also does not enforce a temporal property. But the sequence of 
the events needs to be tested. First of all, the receiver receives a classified 
document from the sender, and determines that the classification of the document 
needs to be revised. The receiver next requests a revision from the sender. As it is 
stated in the rule that only the holder can ask for revision, the counting property 
needs to be checked to make sure that there is a sender and a holder. 
   4. Rule 4 
The holder (i.e., the department head, or section head) is required to: 
• Evaluate the classification level of the classified documents 
• If secret, assign an agent to preserve the documents 
The agent is responsible for preserving the documents labeled Secret. As a 
counting property, if there is a secret document, then there must be a document 
holder to assign an agent and an agent to preserve the document. The number of 
actors in each role type must be counted, because the policy may specify any 
arbitrarily large number of actors in each role type. The responsibility of the agent 
starts when the holder of the document fulfills the obligation of evaluating the 
classification of a document labeled Secret and designating an 
agent(Precondition). 
   5. Rule 5 
The sender (i.e., the agent who is required to prepare the classified 
document) is obliged to: 
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• Prepare the classified document 
• Establish an entrust note 
• Pass the document to the head of the department for signature 
The department head of the sender is obliged to sign this entrust note. If 
the head of the department delegates its signing authority, the delegated 
representative is obliged to sign the entrust note. In this rule, there must be a 
sender and an authority to sign the entrust note. The signing authority can either 
be the head of the department or the representative. 
   6. Rule 6 
The visitor is required to: 
• Get an authorization from the head of that restricted area 
• If the visitor gets the authorization to enter, then the visitor 
waits to be supervised by a supervisor who is assigned 
The counting property needs to be tested are the visitor, the head of the 
restricted area, and supervising agent. The sequence of the events needs to be 
fulfilled before visiting the restricted area are: 
• Obtain authorization 
• Assign a supervisor 
• Visit the area 
   7. Rule 7 
The holder of the classified document required doing the following for 
destruction of every document labeled Secret: 
• Find an agent (i.e., witness) for the destruction 
• Destroy the document 
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• Sign destruction time, date, and name of holder of the 
document 
The witness is required to sign the destruction time, date and name of the 
witness after destruction. The temporal property needs to be tested is the 
destruction time and date.  The holder agent and witness must be present at the 
time of destruction. Therefore, the counting property needs to be used to test for 
the existence of two actors. In the sequence of events, after every destruction the 
signing must take place. 
   8. Rule 8 
The organizer is obliged to burn the preparatory documents of the meeting 
completely. In the sequence of events, the organizer must burn the preparatory 
documents after the meeting is held. The only actor in this rule is the organizer. 
   9. Rule 9 
Unless the organizer of the meeting burns preparatory documents, the 
organizer is required to keep preparatory documents in a safe. In other words, the 
testing has a if-then-else pattern in this rule. 
   10. Rule 10 
For each meeting, the organizer who is the only actor in this rule is 
required to establish a participants’ list. As a temporal property, the list must be 
prepared before the meeting. Therefore, the due time of the participants’ list must 
be checked to be before the starting of the meeting. 
   11. Rule 11 
The agent is required to work on the secret-level classified document in a 
protected area. Temporal test cases must test the time the agent works on a 
Secret_level document and whether it is in a protected area or not. The only actor 
in this rule is the agent. 
“What would happen if the agent moves to another work area in which it 
has authorization to enter?” To test such a scenario, based on the background 
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knowledge  or the policies in place, the agent might be searched. If the search 
results indicate that the agent is mobile, then the agent is given the right to work 
with the secret document in the new protected area. The mobility can also be 
confined to either to a specific policy environment or a broader environment. The 
testing needs to test whether the agent’s move is within permitted boundaries. For 
example, AgentA has full mobility in places where policy objects PA, PB are valid. 
If the AgentA’s movement is within PA and PB’s boundaries then permission is 
granted. Otherwise, it is prohibited.  
   12. Rule12 
The author and the holder of the document are the two actors in this rule 
(counting property). The holder of the document is required to do following: 
• Destroy secret level document 
• Sign destruction time and date 
• Inform the author of the secret level document 
Test cases are required to test the sequence of events that the holder of the 
document labeled Secret does during destruction of the document and notification 



















Rule 1 1 0 1 101 
Rule 2 0 1 0 010 
Rule 3 0 1 1 011 
Rule 4 0 1 1 011+   Precondition 
Rule 5            0 1 1 011 
Rule 6 0 1 1 011 
Rule 7 1 1 1 111 
Rule 8 1 0 1 101 
Rule 9 0 1 1 011 
Rule 10 1 1 1 111 
Rule 11 1 1 0 110+ Scenario 
Rule 12 0 1 1 011 
 
Table 1. Policy Test Property Distribution Table.( 1= applies to that rule, 0=does not 









E. HOW CAN WE HANDLE DIFFERENT QUERIES AT THE TEST 
SPECTRUM? 
The test spectrum has query-specific tests at one end, and the generic 
types of tests at the other end. In the middle of this spectrum are various 
combinations of these types. Different kinds of queries are created to test the 
policy base across the spectrum.  The policy base is dynamic, so that the tactical 
testing  strategy needs to be changeable on-the-fly. 
Picking up a random set of test cases and trying to test the policy subset or 
policy subsets will force exhaustive testing which is known to be computationally 
intractable. In the worst case, we need to test all of the policy subsets and the 
interactions among them. Under best-case conditions, testing representative parts 
of policy subsets and their relations is sufficient. 
Commonly tested features in the rules of policy subsets can be gathered 
into generic test types. The key effort is to design the policy base in an object-
oriented way such that it eases the creation of generic test types. Even in already-
built policies, the testers can give the feedback to the policy makers to state the 
policy in a different way that facilitates the creation of generic types.  The policy 
makers should ask the following questions: 
• Are the rules in different policy subsets equivalent or can they be 
stated in a different way? 
• How can we state the policy rules in such a way that makes it readable 
by computer? 
Policy subsets are not stand alone objects in the organizations, they 
interact with each other. The generic types can be used to test different policy 
subsets working in the same environment. Testing policy subsets separately does 
not give inconsistencies that emerge when policy subsets tested together. 
The automatic testing tool is takes the policies that are involved in the 
testing in the generic query,stepping through the entire policy base under test 
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(PBUT) or policy base subset under test(PBSUT). At this point, the tool tries to 
decide: 
• What combination does each policy subset fall under? 
For each combination, the system will do summation. For example, fifteen 
of the ‘101’ patterns, five of the ‘001’ patterns, and so on. Even in our case study, 
which consists of a small policy base, patterns emerge. Then by using expert 
system, the system decides in this sequence: 
The PBUT has fifteen of the ‘101’ pattern, five of the ‘001’ pattern and so 
on, see Table 1. 
What do these results mean in terms of the computational  of the test cases 
to be run. The system can be designed to have heuristic rules that guide the 
automatic test tool  at this point. An example of heuristic rules can be: 
• Telling the user that the testing process is going to take a long 
time, does he/she want to continue testing? 
• Telling the user to refine the query that is submitted. 
Otherwise, the system is going to perform intensive testing. 
• Ask the policy workbench user to weight the importance of 
each of the tests or types of test cases 
The heuristic rules guide the system to user-defined paths. The advantage 
of that is that the user is informed of the sequence of the events that will take 
place. Unless the user is informed of  the events,  at the end the system might end 
up with an infinite number of candidate tests to run or come up with nothing 
practical. For practicality reasons, the user is given the chance to guide the test-
case selection process at critical points. Most of the cases the testing results closed 
to a reference-testing curve is enough and practical. Thus heuristic rules enable 
timely and practical responses. However, it is unclear how practical it is to rely on 
the policy user to make wise decisions in this regard. 
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Figure 4. Relative Frequency Distribution of the Test Cases for the Policy Base in the 
Case Study. 
      The histogram of the test patterns/cases shows the function of the test 
patterns under PBUTs. The shape of the curve gives us what strategy to use in 
testing that SUT and where to focus our testing effort to obtain the  most fruitful 
results with a minimum of the testing resources.  
      The system keeps the history for each of the PBUT tests. Given that 
particular types of testing patterns that are executed (successfully or not), 
statistical inference can be done as described below: 
The policy-workbench user applied the patterns after running n number of 
test cases, the meta statistics say that the system has thirty-five percent that will 
succeed under given a set of PBUTs.  Under these conditions, “what group of 
patterns has the highest probability of being within the correct testing area?” 
Based on the factors such as resources at hand, time constraint and criticality of 
the testing, the testers decided to execute all of the or some of the picked-up 
patterns. One of the advantages of visualizing  the overall pattern of the PBUT is 
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that the tester has the big picture which guides him to create his testing plan(i.e., 
the road map for the testing process). Thus, a more realistic schema-based testing 
is available. The second advantage is to let the tester map between the highly 
probable patterns and criticality of these patterns.  In Figure 4, the pattern ‘011’ is 
three times likely than any of the other patterns. Thus, the testing tool can check 
this highly probable pattern’s relative importance and focus on it accordingly. For 
instance, ‘000’ pattern does not have any of the properties. But it still conveys a 
meaning to policy-workbench user. It represents a policy that only offers guidance 
or states facts.  
Using a rule pattern language facilitates pattern recognition effort in large 
policy bases. Arsanjani[53] proposed a rule pattern language that can be used for 
expressing patterns. 
 
F. QUERY MAPPING  
The PBUT has rules(i.e., R1( o1,o2, o3,…,on)) and the testers develop 
queries such as Q1( t1,t2, t3,…,tn) to test the PBUT. The mapping procedure is as 
follows: 
• Map terms in queries such as t1,t2, t3,…,tn    to each rule in the PBUT 
such as o1,o2, o3,…,on (Figure 5). 
• Map terms o’s such as o1, o2, o3…on in rules to the o’s in other rules. 
For instance search for the mapping between the o’s in R1 and R3 
(Inter-queryrelationship). See Figure 6. 
• Map terms o’s such as o3…on   in each rule to the other o’s in the same 
rule. For instance search for mapping between the o’s in R1 (Intra 
relationship). See Figure 7. 
• Search for predicates such as P (P1, P2), which is between the 
predicates (i.e., P1 (o1, o2), P2 (o2, o3)) that are found in earlier steps 
(Semantic mapping). See Figure 8. 
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• Search for semantic mapping among queries such as P1 (Q1, Q2). 
 Firstly, the system tries to search for mapping from the terms of the 
queries to the related rule terms. Searching for such a mapping enables us to 
figure out the rules involved in that particular query and which parts of the rules 
are involved in it. Each of the queries are executed in this mapping process.  
Secondly, mapping among the terms of the rules in different rules are 
searched.  Once the mappings of the terms among PBUT rules is completed, then 
the interdependency and relation types of the rules among them can be easily 
shown. For instance, t2 of Q1 can have relationships to o1, o3 of R1, o2, o3  of R3. 
Even if Q1 does not directly has a relationship to the o4 of R3, because o3 of R1 has 
relationship to o4 of R3, Q1 has an indirect relationship to o4 of R3. If the inter 
relationship among the rules are not searched, this dependency does not come up 
and is skipped by the testing process. 
Thirdly, the mapping among the terms of the same rule is searched. The 
terms of the rules do not necessarily have to be variables: they can also be 
predicates. Thus, there might be a relationship among them. Just testing the query 
terms that directly relate to the terms or predicates of the relevant rule might cause 
the testing tool to skip testing the relationship among rule terms. For instance, t2 
of  Q1 can have relationships to o1, o3 of R1. The o3 of R1 has intra relationship to o5 
of same rule which is R1. Even if  t2 of  Q1  does not directly have a relationship to 
o5 of  R1, there exists an indirect relationship among them. If the tester only tests 
direct relationships, then the semantic relationship might be skipped. Having a 
detailed mapping of terms facilitates the detected of such as gaps, and 
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Figure 8. Semantic Mapping Diagram. 
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G. FUZZY LOGIC AND POLICY TESTING 
Unquestionably, computers proved to be highly effective in 
dealing with mechanistic systems, that is inanimate systems whose 
behavior is governed by the laws of physics, chemistry, and 
electromagnetism. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about 
humanistic systems[48].  
Zadeh proposed to abandon the high standards of rigor and precision that 
we have become accustomed to expect and become more tolerant of approaches 
which are approximate in nature. The problem is the excessively wide gap 
between the precision of logic and the imprecision of the real world. Policy-
making is a human enterprise. As such it integrates many complementary, 
contradictory, fuzzy, and changing human values[46].  
Fuzzy logic, in a narrow sense, is a logical system that aims at a 
formalization of approximate reasoning[47]. In a broad sense, Zadeh asserted that 
fuzzy logic is almost synonymous with fuzzy set theory. Fuzzy set theory is 
basically a theory of classes with unsharp boundaries, that is a  class in which the 
transition from membership to non-membership is gradual rather than abrupt[48]. 
In short, fuzzy logic extends traditional logic and enables it to handle 
approximations and nonnumeric variables.  
   1. What does Fuzzy Logic Offer? 
Fuzzy logic provides a systematic way to deal with reasoning under 
uncertainty.  There exist real-life situations to represent and reason about 
uncertainty for which probability and randomness do not suffice. Zimmerman 
[49] states that fuzzy logic offers the rigor of formal methods without requiring 
undue precision. It also offers alternative methods to handle policy preferences 
and conflicts.  
Despite fuzzy logic work[47] on modeling computer security, policy using 
fuzzy logic little else of substance has been reported on the use of fuzzy logic in 
policy structuring and testing. 
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   2. What can be the Fuzzy Concepts in the Policy Workbench? 




• Informal policy rules  
• Natural language policy objectives 
• Natural language policy specifications 
• Policy testing techniques 
• Classification levels 
Prototypes[51] are used as a useful notation for simplifying the complexity 
of the real world. The concepts mentioned above can be considered to be fuzzy 
logic prototypes for a policy workbench. Different classes of policies can be also 
considered as prototypes. These prototypes enable one to maintain a simple and 
useful concept without the diversity and complexity of the members of these 
fuzzy sets. The test-patterns concept discussed before fits into the prototypes. The 
test patterns can facilitate the tester’s conversion to prototypes. 
   3. What Techniques of Fuzzy Logic can be Applied to Policy 
Testing? 
Fuzzy logic techniques that can be applied to policy structuring and testing 
can include the following: fuzzy constraints, realistic policy modeling, 
nonnumeric variables, and fuzzy decision-making. 
A fuzzy constraint is an objective, that can be characterized as a fuzzy set 
in an appropriate space [49]. For instance, an example of a fuzzy constraint within 
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our case study is “The organizer of the meeting is obliged to incinerate the 
preparatory documents of the meeting within twenty-four hours after the 
meeting.” By converting the existing rules slightly, they can have the form which 
we can apply fuzzy logic. Once the rules in the policy are put into a fuzzy form, 
one can use fuzzy logic to reason about “short” vs. “long” vs. “sort of short” etc. 
The fuzzy counterpart of the same rule is “The organizer of the meeting is obliged 
to incinerate the preparatory documents of the meeting a short time after the 
meeting.” Therefore, the fuzzy constraint is “Burn_The_Preparatory_Documents 
in a short time.”  
A fuzzy goal is an objective which can be characterized as a fuzzy set in 
an appropriate space [49]. For instance, “The sender of a classified document is 
obliged to update the document classification as soon as it is possible, that is, 
immediately after the sender evaluates that the document classification is 
obsolete” is a typical goal. Based on this policy, some examples of the fuzzy goals 
can be as follows: 
• Update immediately 
• Update after evaluation 
A fuzzy decision is the fuzzy set of alternatives resulting from the 
confluence of the goals and constraints [49]. As an example, the fuzzy decisions 
can be expressed as the intersection of the fuzzy goal and constraint sets. 
 
H. ANYTIME REASONING IN POLICIES 
First-order logic (see for example [42]) is used to structure and test policy 
in this thesis. In addition to our work, first-order logic is used in a variety of 
applications such as verification of hardware, and software, and solving resource 
allocation and scheduling problems [41]. However, the use of first-order logic 
automated reasoning in applications with real-time decision-making constraints 
has been inhibited because of the inability to provide good estimates of the 
bounds on the resources needed to solve even very small problems [39]. However, 
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some applications require that the best decision possible with limited resources 
for reasoning (usually the limited resource is time) be made. Anytime reasoning 
algorithms provide weaker or stronger approximations of the satifiable sentences 
within practical usage of resources. Algorithms which give best-effort solutions to 
problems given bounds on the resources available for reasoning are known as 
anytime reasoning algorithms [39]. Anytime reasoning addresses the problem of 
intractability in first-order logic reasoning problems.  
Anytime reasoning uses algorithms whose accuracy of results improve 
gradually as computation time increases, providing a tradeoff between resource 
consumption and output quality [43].  
In testing policy, the end user should have the ability to make a choice 
between a practical answer and an answer that will take too long to generate to be 
of practical use. Organizations keep the testing results in a database. Before the 
automatic testing tool processes the user query, it searches the query database and 
retrieves previously executed queries and their results related to this query. The 
sequence of events is as  follows: 
• Search for previous queries 
• Assess whether the PB has changed  
o Check the policies involved in the query 
o Perform dependency analysis(i.e., traceability) 
After this retrieval, if the testing tool searches for a contradiction, it checks 
for incompleteness and gaps in the policy and estimates whether the test will take 
a longer time. The tools asks the user whether it should continue the long testing 
process or use an anytime reasoning algorithm that will provide approximations 
of the real testing results. The user needs to be able to override the advice of the 
tool. For example, the user may be very risk averse and want a very thorough test 
of the PBUT. If the user selects the latter approach, the system can also inform the 
end user whether the approximations are weaker or stronger than the expected test 
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results. Thus, the end user has an idea about the confidence interval of the results. 
But the end user does not necessarily search for an exact answer consisting of 
tight bounds; wider bounds defining a larger interval might fulfill end user 
requirements expected from testing.  
The system can also have a number of anytime algorithms in its database. 
Using different anytime algorithms can give healthier approximation results. For 
different anytime algorithms, see [43], [44], [45]. Using different anytime 
reasoning algorithm can tailor different types of policy-object querying.  
 
I. TARGET TEST PATTERN SELECTION 
The information repository of the test patterns are comprised of all of the 
test patterns related to PBUTs. The normal distribution of the patterns can be 
developed from the repository. Most of the testing efforts does not permit 
exhaustive testing. In theory, the testing tool could test all of the patterns in the 
repository. However in reality, the tools must rely on performing sampling. The 
sampling process brings an endpoint to the testing tool for running test cases. 
Actually, if the PBUT is small enough, the testing team can run all the test 
cases in the repository. However, this is not the typical case. If the PBUT is not 
small enough to run all the test cases(i.e., N), the testing team picks up a target set 
of test case region within that repository(Figure 9). After the selection of the 
target region, the testing team checks whether the working region and the 
resources at hand is small enough to test all test patterns in the target region. If so, 
the testing tool will  run test patterns. Otherwise, the tool will pick up only a 
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Figure 9. Target Test Pattern Region Selection Diagram. 
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Figure 10. Sampling Diagram within Selected Target Regions Diagram. 
 The sampling within the target region associated with factors such as loss 
of productivity, loss of property or damage, and injury or loss of human life stem 
from untested areas. Tersely, risk is associated with the sampling process. For 
instance, if the PBUT is a DOD system, this risk might result in loss of mission, 
loss of secrets, or operational losses. If the PBUT is from industry, loss of 
prestige, loss of revenues associated with anti-lawsuits, or loss of productivity 
could result. The risk can defined as follows: 
                            
Risk =  ƒ (       )  
# of successfully run test cases
Total # of test cases within that target region 
vs.  
Magnitude and frequency of losses from exercising the sample of target 
region with losses due to gaps in the PBUT. 
 
J. EXAMPLE OF TARGET PATTERN SELECTION  
Let’s take a PBUT whose quality of the policy base is unknown. The 
target pattern selection process can be as follows: 
• Create a baseline(i.e.,B0) from the first round of testing. 
• Based on phase I, if we detected one of the following: 
o The presence of one or more gaps is detected during operation 
of the PBUT. 
o We update the PBUT. 
• Run another round of tests 
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Either one of the following outcomes can occur. The testing tool can run 
another round of tests. They do not necessarily run the same tests. If the tool 
detects gaps, a new set of patterns to elaborate on gaps will need to be generated. 
If an update occurs, the PBUT is modified, and it becomes necessary to 
recompute the test pattern distribution curve and regenerate test cases.       
• Create a new version of B0              
The previous versions of B0 gives this pattern selection a roll-back 
capability,  as part of a configuration management capability. In the testing of 
policy, there is also a need for configuration control. Considering software 
engineering change notices; the head of the testing team can decide either accept, 
reject, or defer an update request. 
 
K. EXECUTION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
 Resolution-style theorem prover is used in this thesis.  The workflow of 
the proofs is in Figure 11. Firstly, the theorem prover engine tries to find a proof 
for a given Set of Support(SOS). If SOS for a given test case,is too large then the 
time-to-proof may be long. If no proof is generated, then the SOS must be revised 
in this case to limit the search space. In contrast, if SOS is too small, then the 
theorem prover may have too few axioms with which to generate a proof. Thus, 
the test tool will need to use such feeback information to dynamically update the 
SOS for testing purposes. However, in either case – too large of small of an SOS- 
one does not know whether the proof process was unsuccesfull due to the size of 
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Figure 11. Resolution-style Theorem  Prover Workflow Diagram. 
 We run the queries under the following environment: 
• The query in natural language form is converted into first-order 
logic form before the search for a proof.  
• The proof methods used in this thesis is proof by contradiction(i.e., 
refutation) 
• The parameter controling the maximum number proofs that are 
generated is set to 2. 
The patterns of in this policy base distribute as in Table 1. Using these 
patterns we create a test suite associated with user queries or proposed updates. 
As we develop and group test patterns in the policy base, we can use patterns to 
create test suites that guides theorem-prover.  We do sampling within selected 
target patterns. Then, we can develop queries that focus on each target pattern: 
The Query 1 tests ‘010’ pattern, Query 2 tests ‘011’ pattern, Query 3tests ‘110’ 
pattern, Query 4 does not test a specific pattern, Query 5 tests ‘111’ pattern, 
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Query 6  tests ‘011’ pattern. This test suite addresses all of the target patterns( five 
of the test patterns out of six) for this policy base and does not concentrate testing 
on a particular pattern. Moreover, Query 4 introduces an outlier query for the test 
suite.  
For longer proofs, only one of the proofs is included in the body of thesis. 
Others can be found in Appendix. 
   1. Query 1 
Query 1 in natural language(QNL):  
“Are Representative, Holder, Witness, Agent or Organizer of the 
meetings employees of the organization?”  
QNL is converted into QCOMP, to test the query in theorem prover. The 
QCOMP of this query is: 
-(exists d ( 
 (Representative(d) | Holder(d) |  
 Witness(d) | Agent(d)|Organizer(MEETING(d)))  




The query executed in OTTER, the result of the proof in a concise form 
is(for a detailed output of the proof see Appendix D: 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
19 [] -Agent(x16)|Works_For(Agent(x16),Employees(o)). 
59 [] Agent(x26). 
60 [] -Works_For(Agent(x26),Employees(o)). 
69 [hyper,19,59] Works_For(Agent(x),Employees(o)). 
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70 [binary,69.1,60.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
The OTTER comes to a proof by using the clauses of 19 and 59(i.e. -
Agent(x16) | Works_For(Agent(x16),Employees(o)) and Agent(x26) ). The 
OTTER reached to proof at one proof level by hyperresolution. 
   2. Query 2 
Query 2 in QNL: 
“As a head of the sending office, am I required to sign the 
consignment note attached to the classified document originating from our 
sending office?” 
QNL is converted into QCOMP, to test the query in theorem prover. The 
QCOMP of this query is: 
-(exists o ( exists d ( 
      Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o)  & Classified_Document(d) &  
       Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)  
        -> 
        Obliged_To_Sign_Note(Head(Sending_Office(o)), 
    Sign(Consignment_Note(d))) 
       )) 
). 
The query is executed in OTTER, the result of the proof in a concise form 
is: 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 






59 [] Organization(x26). 
60 [] Sending_Office(x26). 
61 [] Classified_Document(x27). 
62 [] Decide_To_Send(x26,Decide(Send(x27))). 





132 [binary,131.1,64.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
The OTTER comes to a proof by using the clauses of 6,59,60,61,62 and 
63. The OTTER uses hyperresolution and binary resolution. 
   3. Query 3 
Query 3 in QNL: 
“While the agent is working on a classified document at secret level, 
does she required to elaborate  that document in a protected area, or can she 
work in a normal office space?” 
QNL is converted into QCOMP, to test the query in theorem prover. The 
QCOMP of this query is: 
-(exists d  
(Agent(d) & Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) &  
 During_Exec(Agent(d), Elaborate(d))  
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 -> 
 ( During_Exec(Agent(d), Work(Protected_Area(d)))) 
        ) 
). 
The query is executed in OTTER, the result of the proof in a concise form 
is: 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
15 [] -Agent(x12)| -Classified_Document(x12)|Classification(x12)!=Secret |  
-During_Exec(Agent(x12),Elaborate(x12))| 
During_Exec(Agent(x12),Work(Protected_Area(x12))). 
59 [] Agent(x26). 
60 [] Classified_Document(x26). 
61 [] Classification(x26)=Secret. 
62 [] During_Exec(Agent(x26),Elaborate(x26)). 
63 [] -During_Exec(Agent(x26),Work(Protected_Area(x26))). 
88 [hyper,15,59,60,61,62] During_Exec(Agent(x),Work(Protected_Area(x))). 
89 [binary,88.1,63.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
The OTTER comes to a proof by using the clauses of 15,59,60,61, and 62. 
The OTTER uses hyperresolution and binary resolution. This query takes 11 
miliseconds more than the Q1 to reach to a proof. 
   4. Query 4 
Query 4 in QNL: 
“What happens if the classification level evaluated is same with the 
current classification level?” 
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The contradiction is searched in this query is “There is not any document 
whose current level of classification is same with the evaluated classification.” 
QNL is converted into QCOMP, to test the query in theorem prover. The QCOMP of 
this query is: 
-(exists d 
     (Classified_Document(d)  
      -> 
      -(exists level (Evaluate_Classification(d) != level 
      ))) 
). 
The OTTER does not  reach to a proof in this query. This query is run to 
the maximum of 100000 seconds, 5091 clauses are kept for search. 38 
hyperresolutions are generated, 3857 paramodulations are generated. The size of 
the SOS is 4256. The result of this query are: 
• Improve the generation of test cases to get a proof in short time.  
• Try to optimize the SOS by adding more additional real-world facts to 
help the OTTER reach a proof  in short time. 
• The systematic way of creating of test cases proposed in this thesis 
does not necessarily guarantee proofs within short time limits. The gap 
must be filled with optimization of the test cases based upon tests.  
   5. Query 5 
Query 5 in QNL: 
“Two agents working in the same department of the organization. 
One of them takes the other as a witness to the destruction of the classified 
document at secret level. Does the witness has to sign the destruction 
minutes?” 
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The contradiction is searched in this query is “There is not any witness 
who is obliged to sign the destruction minutes of the classified document that is 
destructed.” QNL is converted into QCOMP, to test the query in theorem prover. The 
QCOMP of this query is: 
-(exists d 
(Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) & Holder(d) 
&  
DESTROY_DOCUMENT(d) & Actor(d) & Destroyed_Object(d) &  
      Witness(d) & After(Destroyed_Object(d)) 
      & Destruction_Minutes(d)  
 -> 
 Obliged_To_Sign_Destruction(Witness(d),       
            Sign(Destruction_Minutes(d))) 
       ) 
). 
The query is executed in OTTER, the result of the proof in a concise form 
is: 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
11 [] -Classified_Document(x8)|Classification(x8)!=Secret| -Holder(x8)| -




59 [] Classified_Document(x26). 
60 [] Classification(x26)=Secret. 
61 [] Holder(x26). 
60 
62 [] DESTROY_DOCUMENT(x26). 
63 [] Actor(x26). 
64 [] Destroyed_Object(x26). 
65 [] Witness(x26). 
66 [] After(Destroyed_Object(x26)). 





253 [binary,252.1,68.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
This query reachs to a proof after we add more real world facts as clauses 
to the input file submitted to the OTTER. CPU time used  is twice as much of the 
previous queries. The proof requires the witness to sign the destruction minutes of 
the classified document after destruction. 
   6. Query 6 
Query 6 in QNL: 
As a head of the sending office, I am required to sign the consignment 
note attached to the classified document. Can I delegate to the authority to sign 
the establishment note to another agent working in the sending office? 
The contradiction is searched in this query is “The head of the sending 
office can not delegate her signature authority to sign consignment notes to 
another agent working in the sending office.” QNL is converted into QCOMP, to test 
the query in theorem prover. The QCOMP of this query is: 
-(exists o ( exists d ( 
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Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o) & Classified_Document(d) 
&  
Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)  
& Representative(d) & 
 Works_For(Representative(d),Head(Sending_Office(o))) 
 ->    
Permitted_To_Delegate_Sign(Head(Sending_Office(o)), 
Delegate(Representative(d),Sign(Consignment_Note(d)))) 
        )) 
). 
The query is executed in OTTER, the result of the proof in a concise form 
is: 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
7 [] -Organization(x7)| -Sending_Office(x7)| -Classified_Document($f4(x7))|  





59 [] Organization(x26). 
60 [] Sending_Office(x26). 
61 [] Classified_Document(x27). 
62 [] Decide_To_Send(x26,Decide(Send(x27))). 
63 [] Consignment_Note(x27). 
64 [] Representative(x27). 
62 
65 [] Works_For(Representative(x27),Head(Sending_Office(x26))). 





371 [binary,370.1,66.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
This query reachs to a proof. One of the reasons behind the proof is the 
already proved query(i.e. Query1) CPU time used  is five times as much of the 
previous queries.The head of the sending office can give the authority to a 
representative. The execution of the query reminds the following: 
• The unproved queries can be proved by adding additional real world 
facts and running simpler queries before complex ones. 
• OTTER can not create the exact schema of the relationships 
beforehand even if a schema-based approach in structuring policy  






































IV. POLICY TESTING 
 
A. INTRODUCTION TO POLICY  
Policies are statements of goals, or rules or guidance governing the actions 
taken to satisfty goals[See the Michael-Ong-Rowe for more on policy,36]. They 
provide broad direction and goals. The policy as a term is synonymous with the 
preferred behavior.  
Linington[8] treats policy as a prescription that covers a number of actual 
choices. Policies can also be considered as a statement of what to do  after 
observing a series of ad hoc decisions being taken inconsistently. Linington 
defines meta policy as a statement that can define when the policy is applicable, 
what information must be available for the policy to be applied (or the objects 
representing the policy enforcement), defining the decision process of what to do 
if a policy is violated or is inconsistent with another policy, defining the decision 
process of how to evaluate adherence to the policy, and defining all invariants that 
must be adhered to for the policy to be effective.  
According to Pfleeger[22], security policy is a statement that should 
specify an organization’s goals regarding security (e.g., protect data from leakage 
to outsiders, protect against loss of data due to physical disaster, protect integrity 
of data); where the responsibility for security lies (e.g., with a small computer 
security group, with each employee, with relevant managers); and the 
organization’s commitment to security. In other words, security policy is the 
subset of an organization’s policies that pertain to the protection of information 
and computing resources from unauthorized access. Security requirements for an 
information system are derived from security policy. 
 
B. POLICY AS A MOVING TARGET 
Policy is a moving target: the policy of organization changes over time. 
Thus, there is a temporal validity associated with both policy objects and the 
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relationships between policy objects.  Policy changes can be initiated within an 
organization, or by parties external to the organization, such a developer of a 
commercial-off-the-shelf software application: such products have policy 
embedded in them. Thus, an organization needs a means for updating its policy 
base. However,  to do so, an organization needs a policy workbench to help it 
cope with the size and complexity of its policy bases. Moreover, the policy 
workbench should  have rollback and recover capabilities to control updates. 
Configuration management of the updates is also critical to ensure authorized 
updates. Otherwise, the effort to update the existing policy base will end up 
mixing up the current existing policy base. 
 
C. MAINTENANCE OF POLICY 
Berfore operationalizing a change to the policy base, the organization 
needs to assess the potential effects of those changes. In order to assess the effects 
of proposed updates to a policy base, either the user of  policy workbench or one 
of the workbench-based tools needs to pose questions about the change. The 
queries, in turn, serve as basis for testing policy. 
• The policy user or a workbench tool submits an update or query about 
policy. 
• Queries are posed by humans converted from QNL (Query Natural 
Language) to QC (Query Computational). 
• Automated test generator creates the necessary test for that query. 
• One or more testing tools generate and execute test plans. 
• The testing tools send their test results and assessment of the proposed 
change to policy to the user interface module of the policy workbench. 
One of the requirements we envision for the testing tools is that they 
provide for the systematic and repeatable testing of the policy.After the first round 
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of testing, one might find gaps; this requires the correction of gaps and rechecking 
the revised policy base. Testing tools can reuse testing results or test cases, or 
generate new test patterns and cases. 
 
D. TESTING 
IEEE STD 829-1998 defines testing as the process of analyzing a software 
item to detect the differences between existing and required conditions and to 
evaluate the features of the software item[24]. According to Myers[26], testing is 
the process of executing a program with the intent of finding errors. In the context 
of policy, the goal in testing is to detect and identify gaps in the policy base.  
Software testing can only be formalized and quantified when a solid basis 
for test generation can be defined.  Tests are commonly generated from program 
source code, graphical models of software specifications (e.g., control flow 
graphs), and  requirements. The testing process needs to be congruent with that of 
the software development process. In addition, the testing mechanism to be used 
for testing policy needs to describe how the functions the software provides are 
connected in a form that can be easily manipulated by automated means. 
According to Binder[25] “it is the design and implementation of a special kind of 
software system: one that exercises another software system with the intent of 
finding bugs.”  A well-structured, systematic and repeatable approach will, in 
theory, result in a maintainable test suite and a maintainable policy base. Martin 
and McClure[25] stated that operations and maintenance represent up to sixty-
seven percent of the system life-cycle. Thus, it appears that automated tool 
support for testing policy could be of great value to an organization. 
Using an ad hoc approach will result in a failure for diagnosing gaps, for 
instance inconsistencies in the policy base. Kaner[27] states that testing is the 




   1. What are the Steps When Testing Policy? 
Using the test design steps, the policy can be tested with the following 
steps: 
• Identify, model, and analyze the goals and responsibilities of 
the policy under test (PUT). 
• Design test cases based on the external specifications of the 
policy. 
• Add test cases based on heuristics. 
• Develop expected results for each test case or choose an 
approach to evaluate the pass/no pass status of each test case. 
   2. Development of Test Cases in Policy Testing 
 A test case is a set of inputs, execution conditions, and expected results 
developed for a particular objective (Fig. 11). According to Myers[26], one of the 
most important considerations in testing is the design and invention of effective 
test cases. The subject of test-case design is considered to be the crux of software 
testing. The reason for this is that “complete testing” is impossible, that is testing 
of any program for all possible reachable states is an np-complete problem. In 
order to test software adequately but within a short time frame, selecting the 
proper subset of test cases is a necessity.  Hence, the tester or computer-based 
testing tool must determine the subset of test cases that has the highest probability 













Figure 11. Test Case Specification Diagram 
 
Test-case-design methodologies can help in determining the subset of test 
cases to use in testing policy. Some of the desirable properties of a test case are as 
follows[24]: 
• Exercise as many different inputs as possible. In terms of polic, 
the goal is to develop test cases that exercise as many of the 
policy objects  as possible. 
• Covers a large set of other possible test cases. By partitioning 
the input domain into a finite number of equivalence classes, 
one can select test cases that are representative of that 
equivalence class. 
• Tells more about the specific set of input values. 
• Has a reasonable probability of detecting gaps. 
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• Is not redundant. Is neither too simple nor too complex. 
Starting with simple test cases will give the tester each 
module’s gaps. The tester needs to see the outcomes when 
combining more than two test cases are executed. If only the 
simple test cases are executed, these gaps related to 
combinations of two or more test cases cannot be detected. If 
the test cases are too complex, the outcomes are 
insurmountable for the tester.  
E. TEST PATTERNS AND REUSABILITY 
Test-design patterns developed according to the above steps can be reused. 
Reuse is one means for addressing issues associated with system cost, 
maintenance, and adaptability[25]. Object-oriented technology provides explicit 
support for reuse: component can be designed to support a broad range of 
applications and be tailorable.  
Policy designed and structured from an object-oriented model of the 
policy objects and relationships facilitates reuse. An obstacle can be the use of 
different types of object-oriented models for the same policy base. The Unified 
Modeling Language(UML) can be used to address the problem of using different 
models each with different model semantics. Organizations do not require 
structuring and designing each subbranch policies from scratch as a separate 
process. UML diagrams enable one to view policy at multiple levels of 
abstraction. The transition among UML diagrams eases the process of switching 
among the multiple levels of abstraction in which policy is represented. Transition 
among UML diagrams is discussed in [12] and [25]. 
Developing test patterns for the SUT can facilitate testing[26]. The key 
idea here is to create tests from extant patterns represented in a common 
language: the test team can leverage the use of test cases throughout the 
organization rather than having to integrate test patterns from models with 
disparate semantics. Moreover, once the organization creates libraries of test 
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patterns, the suborganizations can use those patterns directly or adapt those 
patterns to their specific policy base.  
In this thesis, we reuse test patterns derived from UML models of policy. 
 
F. STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING TEST CASES 
Test cases are defined with test case specifications. According to IEEE Std 
829-1998, the test case specification includes the following sections: 
• Test case specification identifier. A unique number or name 
• Test items. The features and modules under test are identified. 
References to specifications and manuals can be made here. 
• Input specifications. This section includes the list of all inputs by their 
value interval, and name if they are files. It includes the inputs passed 
by operating system, supporting programs or databases, prompt 
messages displayed, and relationships between them. Timing 
considerations also should be described herein[27]. 
• Output specification: a list all messages and outputs. 
• Environmental needs. Special requirements such as hardware, 
software, and staff should be listed here. 
• Inter-case dependencies. What are the dependencies between this test 
case and the others?  If the ones executed before this one fails, what 
will be done next?  
The strategy for testing is just like an umbrella over the testing process, 
guiding of all of the testing activities. The place of test strategy and test cases in 
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Figure 12. Test Case Specification Diagram[27]. 
One relatively weak strategies for creating test cases is to rely on the 
capture feature of an automated testing tool. The problem associated with capture 
is analogous to the problem posed by inserting constants into the body of 
programs. The capture feature takes the exact sequence of keystrokes, mouse 
movements, or commands and turns them into capture. These captures are just 
like constants. It is advisable to avoid using constants in the body of program. By 
the same token, one should avoid using capture tools. Most of the code that is 
generated by a capture utility is unmaintainable and of no long-term value. 
However, the capture utility can be useful when writing a test because it shows 
how the tool interprets a series of events. 
 Another weak approach involves the creating of test cases without a 
common goal. Such an ad hoc approach can result in the creation of repetitious in 
scripts, which in turn can lead to a poor use of testing resources. 
 In contrast, the testing strategies that work well can be divided into two 
paradigms data-driven and frame-based architecture[27]: 
In the data-driven testing paradigm, the usage of test matrices is a key 
aspect of the data-driven testing paradigm.  Each row in a test matrix specifies a 
test case and each column represents one of the parameters. The execution of the 
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test cases can be as follows. A script reads all of the parameters required for the 
execution of that particular test. Once all of the parameters have been set, the 
script executes that command. As the code is separated from data, the developer is 
not required to modify each test case. The subject matter of data-driven 
automation strategy can include the following [33]:  
• Parameters for inputing to the program;  
• Sequences of operations or commands that make the program 
execute;  
• Sequences of test cases that drive the program;  
• Sequences of machine states that drive the program;  
• Documents the program can read and operate on;  
• Parameters or events that are specified by a model of the system 
(such as a state model or a cause-effect-graph based model). 
The developer can select one of the interfaces to enter data into a file and 
provide different interfaces for testers with different needs and skill sets [33]. 
Data-driven approaches are highly maintainable and easy to work with; test 
matrices assisst the tester in assigning tests within many platforms. 
There are multiple methods used for data-driven approaches. [34] uses a 
spreadsheet of commands. One row contains sequence of commands required to 
execute a test. The benefit of this technique is as the user interface changes, 
instead of rewriting the test code, one just needs to modify the spreadsheet. Some 
other approaches use simple test cases of machine states. 
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The framework in a framework-based architecture paradigm consists of a 
set of functions in a shared library and located between the test scripts and the 
SUT. Thus, the scripts can be programmed independently, regardless of the user 
interface of the software. The scriptwriters can use that set of functions as if they 
are commands of a programming language. 
Choosing small, conceptually unified tasks as functions helps a lot during 
scripting and maintaining scripts. For instance, the openfile() function is an 
example of a frequently used function in the library. Having the openfile() 
function in the library will not only save the scriptwriter time but also improve the 
maintainability of the scripts. 
In addition to the functions, Arnold [35] proposes that scripts be used in 
conjunction with wrappers(i.e., a routine that is encloses another function). By 
adding a logging function or an error handler or a call to a memory monitor, for 
example, the script gains new capabilities without the need for additional code. 
Wrappers can be very useful in stress testing, test-execution analysis, and 
reporting and debugging.  
One weakness of the framework approach is that building all of the 
commands into the library requires a large staff of testers. Kaner notes that 
allocating the testing staff to create the programming library may cause a failure 
in the automation of projects[27]. Another point is that expecting scriptwriters to 
use the library just because it is there is not realistic. Some programmers are not 
inclined to use the code that they did not write. In short, there is a need to manage 
the library. 
In summary, the framework approach is more tedious than the data-driven 
approach to testing. 
 
G. PROPOSED APPROACH TO POLICY TESTING 
The task of using theorem provers, expert systems or any other tools to 
test policy involves a lot of formula manipulations and computations that are best 
tied to mechanical means. One of the viewpoints in the testing is since it is 
impossible to prove the absence of gaps, then demonstrate that the policy is free 
of gaps for specific test cases. The difficulty in this thinking is the enormous 
intellectual effort that is required. For example, in a large organization like the 
U.S. DoD., its suborganizations are distributed throughout the U.S. and the world. 
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Each branch (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) has its 
own set of policies in addition to the global DoD policies.  Sub branches also have 
their own policies in compliance with the global policy. One of the sub branches, 
such as the Naval Postgraduate School, can add a policy. Before the school 
implements the policy, it needs to test whether the policy: 
• is consistent with extant policy 
• is sound in the sense that the policy is not subsumed by extant policy 
• is complete, in the sense that there is at least one policy object that is 
related to a policy object in extant policy base. 
• creates any other types of gaps in the policy base 
   1. Unautomated Testing Process 
If there is not any automated testing in place in the organization, the 
process can be as follows: 
• Add policy is described in natural language 
• The person in charge converts  a proposed policy  from natural 
language to computational language 
• Adapt the computational form at hand to each separate testing 
tool and invoke them in the tool-context 
This part is the most tedious and cumbersome. Because the person in 
charge of adding policy must know how to invoke all of the tools at hand and 
have the ability to develop a computational form specific to these tools. Thinking 
that every staff in charge of policy add/delete/update operations is at the same 
level of expertise throughout an organization is naive.  
• Retrieve the results from the test tools 
• Interpret the results  
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As different tools are used and each tool has its own way of 
handling tests, the tester must interpret the outcomes of these tools separately, 
because each tool produces outputs in its own format. In order to evaluate results 
from different tools, the staff in charge must be able to understand the results and 
then express them in a common format. 
• Convert the test results into a natural language 
• Compare results. 
As the above-mentioned process heavily depends on the abilities of 
the staff in charge of testing, the process of updating policy can result in a highly 
variable situation. Subjectivity and limits of the staff becomes a problem. The 
alternative is to automate the process, replacing the staff-dependent process by a 
systematic and repeatable automated process.  
   2. Automated Policy Testing Process (Our Testing Strategy) 
The following discussion of our strategy refers back to Figure 13: 
• The end user who is responsible for maintaining(i.e., updating) 
submits, in a natural language, a policy and intended update 
operation(e.g., add, delete, change, revert) or a query about the 
extant policy. 
• The update request or query is converted by a natural language 
processing tool into a computational form. 
• An automated test generator creates the necessary test for that 
update operation or query. 
• Test is conducted. 
• The results of test and any associated recommended corrective 
actions are presented to the end user via natural-language 
processing interface. 
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The end user only fills out the query and gets the results. The commands 
and their syntax for invoking testing tools are transparent to the user of the policy 
workbench. Moreover, the user is not required to prepare the query and express it 
in computational form later. Thus, the user is relieved of the mechanical tasks of 
translating and testing policy and can concentrate on performing higher-level 
tasks, such as making policy, or interpreting policy, or decisions based on policy.  
The automated test generator picks up the outputs of the tools and presents it in 
two different interfaces. In one of the windows, the summary of the output from 
the tool and recommended action is presented to the end user. In the second 
window, the detailed output from the tool is presented to the end user.   
Our testing strategy is to make the set of support domain used by a 
theorem prover to be as small as possible. The theorem prover is used to test for 
logical inconsistencies between policies. For discussion of set of support see 
Appendix A. Even a small program can have  1014 unique paths[26]. Policies are 
much more complex than the small program. Trying to search for all the branches 
in a policy base is an intractable problem unless the reasoning program focuses on 
keys that help to narrow down the scope of the search. Moreover, an exhaustive 
testing strategy does not equate to complete testing of all of the relationships 
among policy objects. The reason is that an exhaustive search does not guarantee 
that the policy base is free of logical contradictions between policies. Another 
reason is there might be missing relationships between policy objects that 
precludes the discovery of a logical contradiction. Hence, testing an incomplete 
domain will not result in complete results. On the contrary, narrowing the paths 
enables the program to concentrate on the domain of interest to the user of the 
policy workbench.  
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We also propose to generate tests automatically from the software design 
(i.e., in this thesis policy design), rather than the code. Policy designs provide a 
basis for testing how the software functions behave in a form that can be easily 
manipulated by automated means[31]. Generating test data from high-level 
policy-design notations structured in UML has several advantages. First of all, 
design notations can be used as a basis for output checking, which can reduce one 
of the major costs of testing. Secondly, the process of generating tests from design 
can point to gaps in the design itself. Thirdly, generating test cases during the 
desing of policy allows for testing activities to be shifted to earlier stages of 























































































   3. Benefits of Our Testing Approach 
The benefits of the automated test generator that is developed in this thesis 
are as follows: 
• Systematic way of maintaining policy. 
• Unified approach for applying policy throughout an 
organization. 
• Internal details of the testing are hidden from the end user.  
• The process of invoking tools is hidden from the end user. 
• Turns exhaustive search into a directed search strategy. 
• Increase the probability of finding a relevant answer to search 
as the search is executed in the domain under focus. 
• Assists the end user in achieving a high-level of productivity 













V. RELATED WORK 
A. DISCUSSION 
   1. Policy Specification and Axiomization 
Cuppens and Saurel[2] investigate how to specify a security policy. 
Cuppens and Saurel explore how to formalize security policies in such a way that 
administrators can automatically derive the consequences of the policies in place. 
Cuppens and Saurel have chosen a logic-based approach in an attempt to keep 
their approach as domain-independent as possible. 
In particular, the authors use deontic logic to formalize a set of corporate 
security policies via a case study.  Deontic logic can be used to specify the 
concepts of obligation, permission, and prohibition. The other reasons for 
selecting a deontic-logic-based approach are as follows: 
• Deontic logic is a universal formal language, useful for expressing any 
kind of knowledge or data 
• Tool support exists for deontic logic which support a logical theory 
(several kinds of PROLOG and other theorem provers) 
There is a clear connection between our work and the approach proposed 
by Cuppens and Claurel. For above-mentioned reasons, deontic-logic-approach is 
used in this thesis. However, in this thesis we do not try to tailor our testing 
strategy or approach to a particular type of policy. 
Cuppens and Saurel also shed light on expressing a natural-language 
statement of policy in a formal way and the difficulties encountered during their 
research. One of the main difficulties is the natural complexity and ambiguity of a 
text in a natural language. Obtaining a correct and as precise as possible 
interpretation of the policy at hand becomes crucial in this respect. An 
organizations may use somewhat imprecise wording in their policies so that the 
interpretations of the policies can vary from one suborganization to another. 
81 
However, the authors claim that it is difficult to automate the process of giving 
domain interpretations of the policy. 
In additon to Cuppens and Saurel, Moffet and Sloman[3] also proposed  
deontic logic as a sound approach to formalize policy.  
Michael, Sibley and et.al.[1] investigate the formalization of security 
policies using a logic-programming paradigm. The authors assert that one should 
use a structural model of policy objects and relationships to guide the 
axiomization of policy. In their case study, they compare model-based approach 
with one with no pre-structuring (unstructured approach). Both of the approaches 
used predicate calculus. In the structured approach, an Extended Entity 
Relationship Diagram is used to develop the schema. In the ad hoc approach, the 
security policies are axiomatized without the aid of schema. 
The results of the schema-based approach provides a common referent for 
terms used in rules and the relationships between the rules. For the unstructured 
approach, the number of axiomization errors increases as the axiom base is 
refined. 
We adopt UML notation is used to model the objects and the relationships 
in the policy. 
   2. Policy Testing  
Cuppens, Saurel and Carrere[4] propose an approach to detect and resolve 
conflicts between normative policies. They define the security policy in a broad 
sense; as of set of norms to be enforced by agents.  The authors address the 
following topics: 
• Semantic heterogeneity 
• Domain constraints 
• Completeness problem 
• Conflicting norms problem 
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Cuppens et.al suggest a language to specify regulations and show how to 
use this language in a case study. In our thesis, we follow some strategies 
proposed by authors for axiomizing policy in deontic logic. In particular, the 
authors provide strategies for resolving normative conflicts when merging 
different policies. Firstly, they created a hierarchy of strategies to resolve 
conflicts: atomic strategy, meta strategy, and good strategy. Then, they applied 
these strategies to resolve conflicts to obtain a global non-conflicting security 
policy base.  
Schmid, Ghosh, and Hill[5]’s main objective is to develop test generator 
to test the robustness of Windows NT . They develop both a binary wrapping and 
a fault injection technique to test for robustness. The authors use a configuration 
file that triggers the automation of the robustness testing of Windows NT. In this 
thesis, the configuration file takes the axiomatized policy base , and based on 
queries invokes the the related tools with the required parameters.  
Schmid, Ghosh, and Hill assert that the wrapper serves as a tool that 
simulates the effect of failing system resources, such as memory allocation, 
network failures and file input/output problems. We use their general philosophy 
to “wrap” policy, much as the authors use software wrapper to simulate the 
conditions under which the policy fails.  
Kim and Carlson[6] investigate the generation of test plans during the 
design stage of system development. They propose three software testing metrics 
for object-oriented Software Development:the most critical scenario, the most 
reusable component, and the most reusable subpath.  
Kim and Carlson used interaction diagrams to identify the relationships 
among the objects in the testbench. They derive use-case matrices from the 
interaction diagrams,  a collection of specific variants of an executable sequence 
of use-case actions.  
In this thesis, we use interaction diagrams to direct the application of 
testing to specific subsets of the policy base.  
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   3. UML as Policy Representation Framework 
Putnam[7] introduces a representation of policy based on the ISO/ITU 
Reference Model for Open Distributed Processing (RM-ODP). They investigate 
how certain behavior can be specified and achieved in an object-based system, 
using the constructs of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Object 
Constraint Language(OCL). 
The focus of Putnam’s work is on policy for fault tolerance. Specifications 
of contracts and policies provide a baseline against which to describe deviations 
from expected behavior of a system. A fault-tolerance policy is defined as a rule 
about a failure mode that is not allowed to occur. 
Putnam represents fault-tolerance policy in UML in conjuction with object 
and processing aspects of the fault-tolerance mechanisms, to achieve a good 
specification that includes some of the behavioral semantics of fault tolerance. 
Putnam describes some limitations with using UML to represent the full 
semantics associated with fault-tolerance policy.  Putnam also discusses the lack 
of tool support for represent policies with full semantics.  
Linington[8] explores the requirements for defining communities and 
expressing policies within a UML environment. The author mentions the 
weakness of UML in supporting the combination of existing, parameterized 
specifications and, in particular, for defining and managing policies.  
The author puts forth the idea of invariant in the policies to keep the 
policies as short and manageable as possible. Linington states that the statement 
of objective in ODP can not be satisfied within UML: additional forms of a 
constraint language are required.  However, a sound strategy for expressing policy 
in UML is given by Linington. In the representation of the policy using UML, the 
options for representation are as follows: 
• Defining Policies as Classes 
The author of a policy defines a new class, which is slotted into the 
specification and defines the detailed behavior of the policy. The challenge is to 
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try to construct a sufficiently narrow interface to make substitution safe without 
loss of expressive power. 
 
• Defining Policies as Communities 
This approach follows the same style as above, but ads the 
discipline of the ODP community and role framework to declare and explicitly 
structure the elements affected by the policy. 
• Defining Policies as Diagrams 
Another approach is to partition each policy from the remainder of 
the specification by making use of the presentation structure. As compared to the 
others, this approach puts little restriction on the policy specification. 
Linington  compares and contrasts the foregoing alternatives. 
Voas and Miller[9] introduce the PIE (Propagation analysis, Infection 
analysis and Execution analysis) technique, which can be used for predicting the 
fault-revealing power of test cases. Data about test cases are used to create 
histograms. Each bin in a histogram represents a single test case. The score in a 
bin predicts the likelihood that the test case will reveal a fault through the 
production of a failure (if a fault exists in the set of program locations that the test 
case executes).  
The authors’ preliminary experiments suggest that the histogram technique 
that they present in this paper can rank test cases according to their fault-tolerant 
revealing ability. The application of the technique results in the grouping of test 
cases into a suite according to each test case’s revealing capability.  
Evans[17] proposes a rigorous analysis technique for UML based on the 
use of diagrammatical transformations. Evans uses the class diagrams to perform 
a number of deductive transformations. By leveraging the intuitive and 
understandable nature of UML and object-oriented methods, the author used these 
diagrams for developing deductive transformation rules. Although Evans’ work is 
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limited to class diagrams, it may be possible to reason with other UML diagrams 
in a similar fashio, thus making it possible for practitioners to use UML without 
relying on complex linguistic techniques. 
In this thesis, we apply both deontic language and UML notation. UML 
diagrams provide patterns from which to identify the relationships among policy 
objects.  
Selonen, Koskimes and Sakkinen[19] discuss various general approaches 
and viewpoints of model transformations in UML. Model transformations are 
essential for model checking, merging, slicing and synthesis. As UML provides 
various diagrams at different perspectives or abstraction levels, transformations 
among UML diagrams can automate a substantial amount of model 
transformation operations in both forward engineering and reverse engineering.   
The authors’ idea of transformation among UML diagrams eases the 
process of merging different policy objects. By using the authors’ transformation 
approach, the conflicts and violations caused by policy operations can be 
minimized. In this thesis, transformations of UML diagrams help in the 
automation of different query types to different types of policy objects. 
Considering that large organizations can have a large number of sub-organizations 
and branches underneath, the transformation will enable small branches to 
increase or decrease their abstraction levels in UML diagrams. Branches need 
detailed UML diagrams to specify the actual setting of their policy in detail but 
they have to update their notation and diagrams for organization-level policy.  
Favre and Clerici[18] defines a forward engineering method that facilitates 
object-oriented code generation from UML models. Favre and Clerici try to 
embed code generation within a rigorous process that facilitates reuse. Their code 
generation process consists of three main phases: 
• The construction of an incomplete algebraic specification from 
UML models. 
• The construction of a complete algebraic specification. 
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• The transformation of the specification obtained into object-
oriented code. 
The work of Favre and Clerici differs from that described in this thesis in 
that they use a semi-automatic process from UML class diagrams to algebraic 
specifications in the GSBL language; we use UML diagrams to structure policy 
and describe the architecture.  
Shroff and France[13], tries to formalize the primary UML constructs used 
to build class structures. The authors use Z notation to express the meaning of 
UML class structures. In other words, their intent in integrating Z and UML is to 
create machine analyzable UML models through the generation of Z 
specifications. They propose a formal semantic base for UML class models. 
Shroff and France aim to fill the lack of firm semantic foundations for object-
oriented modeling.  
The paper does not relate to this thesis directly. But it helps in 
understanding the bridge between the UML diagrams and formal semantic base. 
The authors covered the associations, aggregations and generalization in a clean 
way. Their work paves the way to a full semantic base for object-oriented design. 
Selic describes the usage of UML in real-time systems to predict system 
properties and consider physical logical resources before fully implementing a 
system. This paper does not relate to this thesis directly, but could be used to 
consider issues related to expressing and testing policy regarding  real-time 
systems. 
   4. Formal Methods in Policy Structuring and Testing 
Linington, Milosevic, and Raymond[28] extend the Reference Model for 
Open Distributed Processing (RM-ODP), and introduce the notion of an 
enterprise viewpoint, and provide a minimal set of concepts for structuring 
enterprise-language specifics. The authors explore how policy can be modeled 
between and within communities. In particular, they investigate how policies in 
different communities interact and how a community can impose policies.  
87 
The deontic logic is the way that we express policies in this thesis. The 
authors defined deontic logic, the challenges with using deontic logic. Permission, 
obligation, and prohibition are defined examples are given of these terms- 
encompass. They give real-world examples of permission, prohibition and 
obligation. Differences among these terms is explained.  Policy making, creating 
policy frameworks, and enforcing policy are the other notions explained in the 
paper.  
The authors’ work sheds light on this thesis by expressing the permission, 
prohibition, and obligation in a concise manner. Their work differs from this 
thesis in such a way that their research is focused on ODP and policy making in 
ODP. The authors argue for the use of communities to aid the process of policy 
representation. One way of expressing policy is by expressing policy objects as 
communities. In contrast to the foregoing approach, in this thesis policy 
representation is performed via  class diagrams and sequence diagrams.  
Kim and Carrington[29] explore the visualization formal specifications. 
They mentioned that formal notations provided by most formal specification 
techniques are not easy to use and understand by the general populace. Kim and 
Carrington try to visualize both the static and dynamic aspects of the formal 
specifications.  
The authors use Z specifications as an example and visualize these 
specifications in UML. Even if they suggest the use of Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) to supplement the lack of expressiveness of the graphical 
notation to specify complex constraints precisely, they prefer to express these 
constraints diagrammatically.  
During translation from Z specification to UML class diagram, they 
analyze the semantic relations between variables declared in the state schema and 
the UML class constructs. Later on, the variables are translated to the most 
appropriate UML class constructs depending on their semantics.  The diagrams 
the authors produce are just as complex as the formal specifications. The 
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expressiveness power of the diagrams is weak, Kim and Carrington lay the 
groundwork for visual representation of formal specifications. 
The focus of this thesis differs from that of Kim and Carrington in that 
UML is used to structure the policy and define the relationships among different 
policy objects to guide the formalization policy, rather than attempt to visualize 
an existing formalized policy into a visual representation. 
Ober[18] proposes an executable profile for UML, that will add rigor and 
allow some advanced features to be added in supporting tools.  Ober choose 
Abstract State Machines (ASM), or also known as evolving algebra, to create the 
executable profile. The advantage of the ASM is the ability to describe the 
semantics of UML. Ober lays the groundwork for executable profiles. 
The author’s work relates to this thesis in the following ways: 
• Their effort concentrates on increasing the expressive power of 
UML. Our work in this thesis is confined to structuring and 
defining policy in UML.  
• UML is used as a graphical notational tool in this thesis; main 
goal of this thesis is structuring and testing policy in an 
automated way rather than adding precise semantics to the 
language. 
Ober addresses the question of  “why should one build precise formal 
semantics into UML?”  
Abdurazik and Offutt[31] introduce test criteria based on UML 
collaboration diagrams. Tests are commonly generated from program source 
code, graphical models of software (such as control graphs), and 
specification/requirements. The authors propose using collaboration diagrams to 
represent a significant opportunity for testing because they precisely describe how 
the functions the software provides are connected in a form that can easily be 
manipulated by automated means. They use collaboration diagrams to describe 
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how the objects communicate. In particular, they create a model for performing 
static analysis and generating test inputs from UML collaboration specifications. 
The authors assert that tests can be generated automatically from the 
software design rather than the code or specifications. So authors introduced new 
integration-level analysis and testing techniques that are based on design 
descriptions of software component interactions.  









VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
A. SUMMARY 
Organizations are policy-driven entities.  Policy bases can be very large 
and complex. Thus, maintenance of policy and the assurance of the consistency, 
completeness, correctness, and soundness of a policy base necessarily requires 
some level of computer-based support.  Policies of an organization change: there 
is a temporal validity associated with policy.Thus, it is necessary to test a policy 
base each time it is updated. 
A policy workbench is an integrated set of computer-based tools for 
developing, reasoning about, and maintaining policy.  A workbench takes as input 
a computationally equivalent form of natural-language policy statements.  Each of 
the component tools can manipulate the computational representation of policy. 
We developed an object-oriented schema-based approach to structure 
operational policies. Our structural model consists of Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) class and collaboration diagrams.  
A complete structure that has the full semantics of the natural-language 
policies cannot be achieved with the full semantics within the UML framework. 
To fulfill this inadequacy, a precise semantic description is required. We chose to 
use deontic logic in order to model the semantics of permission, prohibition, and 
obligation, as they are used in policy. Policy includes the following that carries 
the specifications of a normative system: 
• When the policy is applicable (i.e., time) 
• What (e.g., information, resources.) allocated to carry out policy 
• How is the degree of adherence to policy to be evaluated 
• What should be done in the event of violation 
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In addition, deontic logic is a universal formal language, for which 
automated reasoning systems can take deontic specifications as input. 
 Starting  with our structural model of policy, we develop test cases to test 
policy bases. The proposed update to the policy base or query about policy 
dictates the content of its corresponding test cases. The Policy Base Under 
Test(PBUT) is analyzed to determine the test cases that need to be generated and 
run. The PBUT is searched by temporal property, counting property, sequence 
property, and  the combinations of these properties. The combinations of these 
properties are used as test patterns for directing testing. 
 A practical solution to test-case development is provided. The test 
spectrum has query-specific tests at one end, and the generic types of tests at the 
other end. Different kinds of queries are created to test the policy base across the 
spectrum under a range of scenarios.  The policy base is dynamic, so the tactical 
testing needs to be changeable on-the-fly. We introduce pattern recognition in the 
test-case database so that a systematic and repeatable rule-based strategy can be 
applied. Heuristic rules guide the automatic test tool. We give examples of 
heuristic rules that can be used in test-case selection and generation.  
 We investigate the use of statistical inference of reuse of test cases by 
determining the patterns  that approximate the query-to-be-executed. The patterns 
that are selected are then used to determine which of the tests in the information 
repository need to be retrieved and executed. 
 Query mapping among queries (intra relationship), query mapping inside a 
particular query (i.e., intra-query relationship) and mapping among predicates 
(i.e., semantic mapping) concepts are introduced in this thesis. Making these 
mappings explicit can increase the likelihood of identifying gaps during the 
testing of policy. 
 Our testing strategy provides a starting point for a automatically testing of 
operational policy. And confirms evidence for automatically generating test cases 
for operational policy by utilizing test patterns. However, there is still a need for 
human intervention to reason about the effectiveness of the testing and take 
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corrective actions. For instance, the set of support provided to a theorem may 
need to be narrowed or broadened to test for logical consistency within a policy 
base. In other words, we propose a systematic way of creating a good first 
approximation of the necessary test cases by utilizing test patterns. However, the 
sufficiency of these test cases relies on automated processing of heuristics and 
human judgement. 
 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Future research topics include the following: 
• Try to implement an object-oriented schema-based approach to 
structure much more complex policy bases.  
In this thesis, the object-oriented schema-based policy approach is 
introduced and used in a compact policy base. The approach is used to structure 
one policy base. The sample implementation in this thesis paves the way for the 
structuring of multiple policy bases. An area of future research would be to 
investigate how to express inter- and intra-policy base relationships and the 
collaboration diagrams that shows the details of these relationships. 
• OTTER is used as a tool in this thesis to determine conflicts, 
inconsistencies, and gaps. Try to use other first-order logic tools to test 
the PBUT. 
One of the reasons behind the selection of first order logic in this thesis is 
that it is a universal formal language for which automated reasoning systems can 
take deontic specifications as input. The goal of a future investigation could be to 
take the policy base in this thesis and implement it in different first order logic 
tools(e.g., METEOR from Duke University, SETHEO, LeanTaP, Bliksem), then 
apply testing tools or strategies that best lend themselves to these formal models.  
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• Try to implement the statistical inference that is applied for the case 
study for a complex policy base with a large information repository of 
possibly diverse test cases. 
A statistical analysis of the history of processing test patterns could be 
used to characterize the PBUT. In this thesis, the concept is explained and a small 
example is given. A real-world example remains to be generated. 
• Try to implement fuzzy logic in a multiple policy base. 
Fuzzy logic brings a systematic way to reason under uncertainty. 
Structuring multiple PBUTs involves fuzzy reasoning by its very nature. Future 
research could take the form of representing multiple PBUTs in fuzzy logic and 
reasoning about them. Policy-making is a human enterprise, integrating many 
complementary, contradictory, fuzzy, and changing human values. It may be the 
case that the use of fuzzy logic is necessary for representing and reasoning about 
certain types or instances of policy. 
• Try to implement the methodology used in this thesis to goal-type 
policy. 
Because goal-oriented policies differs from operational policy, one would 
need to ask the following type of questions:  
o How can we test goal-oriented policy?  





APPENDIX A  OTTER TUTORIAL 
OTTER(Organized Techniques for Theorem–proving and Effective 
Research) [28] is the theorem prover that is used in this thesis as a testing tool.  
This appendix  provides an overview of OTTER, with particular attention paid to 
those aspects of OTTER that are integral to our approach to testing for gaps in 
policy. For an introduction to automated reasoning see[29]. For a tutorial on how 
to use OTTER see [30]. 
OTTER is a first-order logic with equality theorem prover. It is coded in 
C, and its source code is publicly available from Argonne Natioanal Laboratory. 
OTTER recognizes two basic types of statements: clauses and formulas. 
OTTER’s search for proofs operate on clauses. Formulas are first-order 
statements without free variables (i.e., all variables are explicitly quantified). 
 
A. HIGHLIGHTS OF OTTER 
• % starts a comment. Comments are not echoed to the output 
file. 
• . (period) terminates input expressions. 
• ( ) [] { } and , are grouping symbols. OTTER does not treat a 
comma as an operator. 
• Unlike Prolog, OTTER requires whitespace in some cases. The 
rule of whitespace is “Insert some whitespace  if and only if it 
is not a standard application.” In other words, two pices of 
whitespace in (a+  (b+c))=  (d+e) are required, and no 
whitespace is allowed after f or g in f(x,g(x)). 
• OTTER sends most of its output to “standard output” which is 
usually redirected by the user to a file; can be called output file. 
The first part of the output file is an echo of most of the input 
and some additional  information, including indentification 
numbers for clauses and description of some input processing. 
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The second part of the output file reflects research. The output 
can be controlled by various flags. 
• Input to OTTER consists of a small set of commands, some of 
which indicate that a list of objects (clauses, formulas, or 
weight templates) follows the command. All lists of objects are 
terminated with end_of_list. For instance, 
make_evaluable(sym, eval-sym) makes a symbol evaluable.  
• Given an expression how it looks like might be associated in a 
number of ways, because the relative precedence of the 
operators determines, how it is associated. A functor with 
higher precedence is more dominant(closer to the root of the 
term). For instance, the functors −>, |, &, and – have 
decreasing precedence; therefore the expression p & - q | r −> 
s is understood as ((p & (-q)) | r) −> s. 
• OTTER accepts clauses both written pure prefix form and infix 
(abbreviated) form. For instance, Pure prefix: | (-(a), |( =(b1, 
b2), -(=(c1,c2)))) 
































Table 2. Representation of symbols and operators in OTTER. 
 
 
Formulas in Standard Usage Formulas in OTTER 
 ∀x P(x) all x P(x) 
∀xy ∃z (P(x, y, z) ∨ Q(x,z)) all x y exists z (P(x,y,z) | Q(x,z)) 
∀x( P(x) ∧ Q(x) ∧ R(x) → S(x)) all x (P(x) & Q(x) & R(x) -> S(x)) 
Table 3. Representation of Formulas in OTTER. 
 
B. SET OF SUPPORT STRATEGY (SOS) 
 The set of support strategy keys on the denial clause or clauses. It seeks a 
contradiction that gives the theorem-proving program a convenient 
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termination[29]. In an automated reasoning program, the program is expected to 
end after it has generated a proof. To achieve that goal, the program searches for 
the denial of the statement to be proved and its combinations. After the search, the 
program designates one or more as keys. The SOS causes the reasoning program 
to classify newly generated clauses. The SOS strategy forbids a reasoning 
program from ever applying an inference rule to a set of clauses that fails to have 
one the key clauses present. Wos defined the set of support theorem as follows:  
If S is an unsatisfiable set of clause, and if T is a subset of S such that S-T 
is satisfiable, then the imposition of the set of support strategy on the combination 
of binary resolution and factoring preserves the property of refutation 
completeness for that combination[29]. 
In short, the theorem says that, if T is appropriately chosen, then the 
important logical property of refutation completeness of the inference rules being 
employed is not lost.  The proof of the set of support theorem is out of scope of 
this thesis; the proof is given in [29]. 
The main advantage of applying the SOS strategy is that it makes 
reasoning program intelligent. Myers [26] mentioned that even a small program 
can have 10 trillion independent logic paths to be searched.  The computation is 
as follows: 
5 20+519+518+… =1014      where 5 is the number of paths through the loop 
body. 
The program has a do-while loop and set of if-then statements inside it. 
Consider it this way: if one reasoning program could search the branches even in 
such a trivial program, it would take a long time and fail to find a terminating 
point. Real-world programs are much more complex than the simple program 
mentioned above. Moreover, every branch is not independent from every other 
branch in the actual scenarios. In other words, the number of execution paths 
would be somewhat fewer in real-world programs if the reasoning program has 
the intelligence. The set of support strategy makes the reasoning program 
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intelligent. As a result of that, the reasoning program is forced to concentrate on 
the problem domain rather than performing an exhaustive search on the general. 
As an alternative method to SOS, weighting can be used to make 
reasoning programs operate in an efficient-manner. The problem with using 
weighting is that some means of assigning weights must be devised. Typically, 
this is left to the experience and the intuition of the user. The lighter the weight 
the sooner the program will look at that statement.   
 
C. HOW DOES THE SET OF SUPPORT STRATEGY WORK? 
When SOS strategy is in use, only the clauses in the SOS are chosen. 
According to the weighting among them, an increasing order is created inside 
these selected clauses. The rest of the clauses are used to complete the application 
of various inference rules. Then the programs continue to choose among the new 
clauses, those clauses that have been generated and kept because they have 
acceptable information. Weighting enables the program to choose among those 
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APPENDIX B WORKFLOW MODELING WITH NORM 
ANALYSIS 
There are also other ways of structuring and defining rules in a notational 
language other than the methodology used in this thesis. One of them is the 
workflow modeling with Norm Analysis. In [37], the authors developed a 
modeling approach for handling business rules and exceptions to support the 
development of information systems. The workflow modeling is one of the 
methods of object-oriented  information engineering, whereas Norm Analysis is a 
semantic approach for developing information systems[38]. 
The strengths the modeling approach presented in [38] are using object-
oriented information engineering approach, which is a rigorous approach that 
provides a set of techniques for process modeling and using Norm Analysis which 
enables one to specify business rules that are necessary in systems design.  
The first rule of the case study is: 
“The sender of a classified document is obliged to update the document 
classification as soon as it is possible, i.e. immediately after the sender evaluates 
that the document classification is obsolete.” 
(Classified_Document(d) & ( Transmitter(d) = t) &  









Whenever the sender evaluates that the document classification is 
obsolete 
 Then the sender of the document 
Is obliged to 
update the document classification as soon as it is possible 
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APPENDIX C SOURCE CODE OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% File                  : Policy.in 
% Author              : Lieutenant Mehmet Sezgin(Turkish Army)      
% Theorem Prover: Otter 3.0.4   
















% Rule 1 
% The sender of a classified document is obliged to update the document  
% classification as soon as it is possible,  
% i.e. immediately after the sender evaluates that the document  
% classification is obsolete. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all d 
       (Classified_Document(d) & 
Transmitter(d) & Transmitter(d) = Agent(a) & Res_Exec(Transmitter(d),  
Evaluate_Classification(d), level) & Classification(d) != level   






% Rule 2 
% Any agent who is not the sender of a classified document  
% is prohibited to change the classification of this document. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all d 
        (Classified_Document(d) & Transmitter(d) != Agent(a)  








% Rule 3 
% The holder of a classified document  
% is permitted to ask the sender to revise the classification of this document. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all d 




        ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 4 
% Every organization, which holds some secret documents,  
% is obliged to designate an agent who is responsible for preserving these   
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% documents.    
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all o ( exists d ( 
Organization(o) & Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) 





       )) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 5 
% The sender of the classified document  
% is obliged to establish a entrust note of this document.  
% The head of the sending side is obliged to sign this entrust note.  
% The head of the sender side  
% is permitted to delegate the obligation to sign the note to one of his  
% representatives. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all o ( exists d ( 




        )) 
). 
 
(all o ( exists d ( 
 Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o)  & Classified_Document(d) &  
 Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)  




       )) 
). 
 
(all o ( exists d ( 
 Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o) & Classified_Document(d) &  
Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)  & 
Representative(d) & 
 Works_For(Representative(d),Head(Sending_Office(o))) 
 ->    
Permitted_To_Delegate_Sign(Head(Sending_Office(o)), 
Delegate(Representative(d),Sign(Consignment_Note(d)))) 
        )) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 6 
% Anybody body who wants to visit a restricted area is obliged to get an  
% authorized from the head of that area.   
% In addition to that, the visitor is obliged to be supervised by  
% an agent who is specially designated for supervising visitors. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
( 
 Organization(o) & Protected_Area(a) & (Head(a)) & Person(p) &  
 ( -(Work_For(Person(p),Organization(o))) &  
 -Authorized_To(Head(a),  
   Authorize(Person(p), Visit(Protected_Area(a)) 
)))  
 ->  
 Forbidden_To_Visit( Person(p), Visit(Protected_Area(a))) 
). 
( 
 Organization(o) & Protected_Area(a) & Head(a) = h & Person(p) &  
 -(Work_For(p,o)) & Exec(h, Authorize(p, Visit(a))) &  
 Exec_Designate_Agent(h, Designate_Responsible( Supervision(p)))  
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 ->  
 Permitted_To_Visit( p, Visit(a)) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 7  
% The holder of the secret document and the witness of the destruction   




       (Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) & Holder(d) &  
 DESTROY_DOCUMENT(d) & Actor(d) & Destroyed_Object(d) &  






       ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 8 
% After each meeting, the organizer of the meeting  
% is obliged to burn all the prepatory documents of this meeting completely. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all d 
 (MEETING(d) & (Organizer(MEETING(d))) & After(MEETING(d)) &  
 Element_Of_Meeting(d, Prepatory_Documents(MEETING(d)))  
 -> 
 Obliged_To_Burn(Organizer(MEETING(d)), Incinerate(d)) 




% Rule 9 
% The organizer of the meeting is obliged to keep these preparotory documents in 










        ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 10 
% The organizer of any meeting is obliged to establish  
% a list of all participants before that meeting. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all d 




        ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 11 
% An agent is obliged to work a classified document at the secret level in a  
% protected area. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all d  
 (Agent(d) & Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) &  
 During_Exec(Agent(d), Elaborate(d))  
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 -> 
 ( During_Exec(Agent(d), Work(Protected_Area(d)))) 
        ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Rule 12 
% After the destruction of a classified document at the secret level,  
% the document holder is obliged to inform the author of the document. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
(all d 
 (Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) &  
 Holder(d) & Exec(Holder(d) , Destroy(d)) & (Transmitter(d))  
 ->  
 Obliged_To_Notify(Holder(d), Notify(Transmitter(d), Destroy(d))) 
        ) 
). 
%%% 
%%% Implicit policies and  real world facts 





% Real World Fact 1 
% If there is a classified document, then this document 
% has a classification level. 
(all d 
       (Classified_Document(d)  
 ->  
       ( exists level (Classification(d) = level)) 




% Real World Fact 2 
% All holders of a document is a organization agent. 
% has a classification level. 
(all d 
       (Holder(d)  
 ->  
       Agent(d) 
       ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Real World Fact 3 
% All agents works for organization and a member 
% of organization’s employees. 
(all d 
       (Agent(d)  
 ->  
       Works_For(Agent(d),Employees(o)) 
       ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Real World Fact 4 
% All transmitters are not organization agents. 
( all d 
       (Transmitter(d) 
        -> 
        ( Works_For(Transmitter(d),Employees(o))) | (Transmitter(d) != Agent(d)) 
       ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Real World Fact 5 
% Secret classified document is  also a document. 
(all d ( 
  Classification(d) = Secret   
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% Real World Fact 6 
% All representatives works for the organization. 
% and they work in the sending office where the  
% document originated. 
(all d ( 
 Representative(d)  




(all d ( 
 Representative(d)  





% Real World Fact 7 
% Agents, Heads, Representatives, Holders, 
% meeting Organizers, Actors, Witnesses are members of the organizations,  
% i.e.they are valid employees. 
 
 
(all d ( 
 (Representative(d) | Agent(d) | Head(d) | Holder(d) |  
 Actor(d) | Witness(d) | Organizer(MEETING(d)))  






% Real World Fact 8 
% If there is a consignment note  
% attached to the document than it is 
% a classified document. 
(all d 
       (Consignment_Note(d)   
 ->  
       (exists d (Classified_Document(d) 
       ))) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Real World Fact 9 
% Destroying a classified document  
% is to incinerate that document. 
% After incineration, it becomes destroyed object. 
(all d 
       (DESTROY_DOCUMENT(d)   
 ->  
       Incinerate(d) 
       ) 
). 
(all d 
       (After(Incinerate(d))   
 ->  
       DESTROY_DOCUMENT(d) 
       ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Real World Fact 10 
112
% If the agent is not permitted to ask for revision of the classification  
% level of the document, then 
% the agent is not forbidden to change the classification of the document. 
(all d 




              )   
 -> 
        Forbidden_To_Change_Classification(Holder(d), Change_Classification(d)) 
        ) 
). 
     
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
% Set of  Support 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
 
( exists d Classified_Document(d)). 
( exists d Transmitter(d) ). 
( exists d Evaluate_Classification(d) ). 
( exists d Classification(d) ). 
( exists d Representative(d) ). 
( exists d Holder(d) ). 
( exists o Organization(o) ). 
( exists d Employees(d) ). 
( exists d Document_Preservation(d) ). 
( exists d Sending_Office(d) ). 
( exists d Establish_Consignment_Note(d) ). 
( exists d Consignment_Note(d) ). 
( exists d Protected_Area(d) ). 
( exists d Person(d) ). 
( exists d Actor(d) ). 
( exists d Destroyed_Object(d) ). 
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( exists d Witness(d) ). 
( exists d Destruction_Minutes(d) ). 
( exists d MEETING(d) ). 
( exists d Organizer(d) ). 
( exists d Prepatory_Documents(d) ). 
( exists d Safe(d) ). 
( exists d Contents(d) ). 
( exists d Agent(d) ). 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 











 APPENDIX D  QUERIES AND PROOFS 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  QUERY I 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
-(exists d ( 
 (Representative(d) | Holder(d) |  
 Witness(d) | Agent(d)|Organizer(MEETING(d)))  




%  PROOFS FOR QI 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
19 [] -Agent(x16)|Works_For(Agent(x16),Employees(o)). 
59 [] Agent(x26). 
60 [] -Works_For(Agent(x26),Employees(o)). 
69 [hyper,19,59] Works_For(Agent(x),Employees(o)). 
70 [binary,69.1,60.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
19 [] -Agent(x16)|Works_For(Agent(x16),Employees(o)). 
59 [] Agent(x26). 
60 [] -Works_For(Agent(x26),Employees(o)). 
69 [hyper,19,59] Works_For(Agent(x),Employees(o)). 
71 [hyper,69,60] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
-------------- statistics ------------- 
clauses given                    40 
clauses generated              26 
hyper_res generated          8 
para_from generated          8 
para_into generated            6 
ur_res generated                 4 
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demod & eval rewrites       0 
clauses wt,lit,sk delete        0 
tautologies deleted             1 
clauses forward subsumed    15 
(subsumed by sos)             12 
Kbytes malloced              159 
user CPU time                   0.69          (0 hr, 0 min, 0 sec) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  QUERY II 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
-(exists o ( exists d ( 
      Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o)  & Classified_Document(d) &  
       Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)  
        -> 
        Obliged_To_Sign_Note(Head(Sending_Office(o)), 
  Sign(Consignment_Note(d))) 
       )) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  PROOFS FOR QII 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 





59 [] Organization(x26). 
60 [] Sending_Office(x26). 
61 [] Classified_Document(x27). 
62 [] Decide_To_Send(x26,Decide(Send(x27))). 






132 [binary,131.1,64.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 




59 [] Organization(x26). 
60 [] Sending_Office(x26). 
61 [] Classified_Document(x27). 
62 [] Decide_To_Send(x26,Decide(Send(x27))). 





133 [hyper,131,64] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
-------------- statistics ------------- 
clauses given                      81 
clauses generated               291 
hyper_res generated         19 
para_from generated         58 
para_into generated          207 
ur_res generated               7 
demod & eval rewrites       0 
clauses wt,lit,sk delete       0 
tautologies deleted             1 
clauses forward subsumed   222 
  (subsumed by sos)           106 
Kbytes malloced              223 
user CPU time          0.92          (0 hr, 0 min, 0 sec) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  QUERY III 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
-(exists d  
(Agent(d) & Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) &  
 During_Exec(Agent(d), Elaborate(d))  
 -> 
 ( During_Exec(Agent(d), Work(Protected_Area(d)))) 
        ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  PROOFS FOR QIII 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
15 [] -Agent(x12)| -Classified_Document(x12)|Classification(x12)!=Secret| -
During_Exec(Agent(x12),Elaborate(x12))|During_Exec(Agent(x12), 
Work(Protected_Area(x12))). 
59 [] Agent(x26). 
60 [] Classified_Document(x26). 
61 [] Classification(x26)=Secret. 
62 [] During_Exec(Agent(x26),Elaborate(x26)). 
63 [] -During_Exec(Agent(x26),Work(Protected_Area(x26))). 
88 [hyper,15,59,60,61,62] During_Exec(Agent(x),Work(Protected_Area(x))). 
89 [binary,88.1,63.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
15 [] -Agent(x12)| -Classified_Document(x12)|Classification(x12)!=Secret| -
During_Exec(Agent(x12),Elaborate(x12))|During_Exec(Agent(x12), 
Work(Protected_Area(x12))). 
59 [] Agent(x26). 
60 [] Classified_Document(x26). 
61 [] Classification(x26)=Secret. 
62 [] During_Exec(Agent(x26),Elaborate(x26)). 
63 [] -During_Exec(Agent(x26),Work(Protected_Area(x26))). 
88 [hyper,15,59,60,61,62] During_Exec(Agent(x),Work(Protected_Area(x))). 
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90 [hyper,88,63] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
-------------- statistics ------------- 
clauses given                    68 
clauses generated              264 
hyper_res generated         16 
para_from generated        121 
para_into generated         122 
r_res generated                5 
demod & eval rewrites    0 
clauses wt,lit,sk delete     0 
tautologies deleted           0 
clauses forward subsumed     238 
  (subsumed by sos)         31 
  (subsumed by sos)         106 
Kbytes malloced              191 
user CPU time                  0.81          (0 hr, 0 min, 0 sec) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  QUERY IV 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
-(exists d 
     (Classified_Document(d)  
      -> 
      -(exists level (Evaluate_Classification(d) != level 
      ))) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  PROOFS FOR QIV 
%        OTTER DOES NOT REACH ANY PROOF FOR QIV . 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  QUERY V 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
-(exists d 
       (Classified_Document(d) & (Classification(d) = Secret) & Holder(d) &  
 DESTROY_DOCUMENT(d) & Actor(d) & Destroyed_Object(d) &  
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 Witness(d) & After(Destroyed_Object(d)) & Destruction_Minutes(d)  
 -> 
 Obliged_To_Sign_Destruction(Witness(d), Sign(Destruction_Minutes(d))) 
       ) 
). 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  PROOFS FOR QV 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
11 [] -Classified_Document(x8)|Classification(x8)!=Secret| -Holder(x8)| -




59 [] Classified_Document(x26). 
60 [] Classification(x26)=Secret. 
61 [] Holder(x26). 
62 [] DESTROY_DOCUMENT(x26). 
63 [] Actor(x26). 
64 [] Destroyed_Object(x26). 
65 [] Witness(x26). 
66 [] After(Destroyed_Object(x26)). 





253 [binary,252.1,68.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
 
11 [] -Classified_Document(x8)|Classification(x8)!=Secret| -Holder(x8)|  




59 [] Classified_Document(x26). 
60 [] Classification(x26)=Secret. 
61 [] Holder(x26). 
62 [] DESTROY_DOCUMENT(x26). 
63 [] Actor(x26). 
64 [] Destroyed_Object(x26). 
65 [] Witness(x26). 
66 [] After(Destroyed_Object(x26)). 






254 [hyper,252,68] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
-------------- statistics ------------- 
clauses given                     121 
clauses generated               1071 
  hyper_res generated         32 
  para_from generated        299 
  para_into generated         735 
  ur_res generated              5 
demod & eval rewrites      0 
clauses wt,lit,sk delete       0 
tautologies deleted             0 
clauses forward subsumed 886 
  (subsumed by sos)           332 
  (subsumed by sos)           31 
  (subsumed by sos)           106 
Kbytes malloced              351 
user CPU time          1.67          (0 hr, 0 min, 1 sec) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%  QUERY VI 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
121
-(exists o ( exists d ( 
 Organization(o) & Sending_Office(o) & Classified_Document(d) &  
Decide_To_Send(o, Decide( Send(d))) & Consignment_Note(d)  & 
Representative(d) & 
 Works_For(Representative(d),Head(Sending_Office(o))) 
 ->    
Permitted_To_Delegate_Sign(Head(Sending_Office(o)), 
Delegate(Representative(d),Sign(Consignment_Note(d)))) 




%  PROOFS FOR QV 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 
7 [] -Organization(x7)| -Sending_Office(x7)| -Classified_Document($f4(x7))|  





59 [] Organization(x26). 
60 [] Sending_Office(x26). 
61 [] Classified_Document(x27). 
62 [] Decide_To_Send(x26,Decide(Send(x27))). 
63 [] Consignment_Note(x27). 
64 [] Representative(x27). 
65 [] Works_For(Representative(x27),Head(Sending_Office(x26))). 






371 [binary,370.1,66.1] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
---------------- PROOF ---------------- 






59 [] Organization(x26). 
60 [] Sending_Office(x26). 
61 [] Classified_Document(x27). 
62 [] Decide_To_Send(x26,Decide(Send(x27))). 
63 [] Consignment_Note(x27). 
64 [] Representative(x27). 






372 [hyper,370,66] $F. 
------------ end of proof ------------- 
-------------- statistics ------------- 
clauses given                     125 
clauses generated               1382 
  hyper_res generated         25 
  para_from generated        213 
  para_into generated         1139 
  ur_res generated               5 
demod & eval rewrites        0 
clauses wt,lit,sk delete        0 
tautologies deleted              4 
clauses forward subsumed  1073 
  (subsumed by sos)            592 
  (subsumed by sos)            332 
  (subsumed by sos)            31 
123
  (subsumed by sos)            106 
Kbytes malloced                 574 

















































% The sender of a classified document is obliged to update the document classification 
% as soon as it is possible, i.e. immediately after the sender evaluates that 





    Update(Class ificationLevel(d)
4:~ [ClassificationLevel(d)] := obselete
    Send(d,s)
M
1: Send(ClassifiedDocument d, Sender s)
2: EvaluateClassification(d)
                             GetNotification(Receiver r, Sender s, ClassifiedDocument(d))
 
 


















% The holder of a classified document is  permitted to ask the sender to revise
%  the classificat ion of this   document.
Receiver:Employee
3:[ClassificationLevel(d)]:= obselete
 AskToRevise(Sender s,ClassifiedDocument d )
Sender:Employee

























% Every organization which holds some secret documents is 
% obliged to 





 Assign(Agent a, ClassifiedDocument d 
4: [ClassificationLevel(d)] < secret
 Preserve(d, NormalStorage n)
5: Preserve(d, a, SecretStorage s)































% The sender of the classified document is obliged to establish 
% a entrust note of this document. 
% The head of the sending side is obliged to sign this entrust note. 
% The head of the sender side is permitted to delegate the obligation 



























%% Rule 7 
%The holder of the secret document and the witness of the 
destruction are obliged to 







































% After  each meeting, the organizer of the meeting is obliged to 
% burn all the preparatory documents of this meeting completely.
Participant:Employee Organizer:Employee
Organizer:Employee
5: Sign( DestructionMinutes(PreparatoryDocument(m), o)
1: Organize( Meeting m)
2: Attend(m)
3:  [Status(m)]:= finished
Destroy(PreparotoryDocument(m), Organizer o)
[Classification(m)]:>= secret





















% The organizer of the meeting is obliged to keep these 
prepatory % documents in a safe,






3:  [Status(m)]:= finished
























% An agent is obliged to work a classified document at the secret level 
in a protected area.
Sender:Employee Receiver:Employee
Agent:Employee
3: Elaborate(d, ProtectedArea p)

























APPENDIX F  GLOSSARY 
 
Automated Testing: The automated generation and execution of test plans 
and test cases from both models of policy and queries about policy. 
Collaboration: A description of a collection of objects that interact to 
implement some behavior within the context. Tersely, collaboration directly 
shows the implementation of an operation. Collaboration diagram is a graphical 
representation of collaboration. 
Community: A set of interacting objects that have come together into a 
configuration so that they can interact to achieve some purpose 
Configuration File: A script containing a test plan that specifies what is 
being tested, test cases and the steps for executing the test plan.  
Deontic logic: A universal formal language, useful for expressing any kind of 
knowledge or data. 
Meta policy: Policy about policy. 
Normative System: A system in which the behavior of the interacting objects 
or agents governed by a set of norms. 
Obligation: A prescription that particular behavior is required. An obligation 
is fulfilled by the occurrence of the prescribed behavior. 
OTTER: A first-order logic with equality theorem prover. 
Permission: A prescription that a particular behavior is allowed to occur. 
Also permission is equivalent to there being no obligation for the behavior not to 
occur. 
Policy: Statements of goals, or rules or guidance governing the actions taken 
to satisfty goals[See the Michael-Ong-Rowe for more on policy,36].  
Policy Base: A database of policies.  
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Policy Workbench: A set of tools for formalizing and assessing policy. In 
other words, an integrated set of computer-based tools for developing, reasoning 
about, and maintaining and enforcing policy. 
Prohibition: A prescription that particular behavior must not occur. Also 
prohibition is equivalent to there being an obligation for the behavior not to occur 
Schema-based Approach: The creation of policy from a model. 
Set of support strategy: A strategy that keys on the denial clause or clauses. 
It seeks a contradiction that gives the program a convenient termination. 
Test criteria: A rule or collection of rules that impose test requirements on a 
set of test cases. 
Test case: A set of inputs, execution conditions, and expected results 
developed for a particular objective. 
 
UML: Unified Modeling Language is a language for specifying, constructing, 
visualizing, and documenting artifacts of software-intensive systems. 
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